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Electronic Records as Documentary Evidence 
Ken Chasse†
Abstract 
he new electronic record provisions that are now part of almost all of the Evidence Acts in Canada are as
important as any statutory law or common law concerning the use of records as evidence. They bring sixT
important improvements to the evidentiary law of business records. It is argued, however, that their most serious
defects are that they: (1) perpetuate the best evidence rule — a rule rendered redundant by electronic records and
information management (RIM); (2) do not deal with hearsay issues; (3) do not cure the defects of the business
record provisions in regard to electronic records; and (4) unnecessarily complicate the law. But these defects can
be substantially lessened by judicial interpretation that accomplishes what the business records provisions should
have accomplished. Although a topic left to a future article, this article should be read with the assumption that
the electronic record provisions are interdependent with: (1) the new electronic commerce laws; (2) the new
personal privacy protection laws; (3) the new electronic discovery guidelines; (4) the new National Standards of
Canada concerning electronic RIM ; and (5) the records requirements of government agencies such as the Canada
Revenue Agency. This article is therefore a first step in justifying the emergence of the ‘‘RIM lawyer’’ as a new field
of legal practice.
electronic form can be judged by their own his-1. Introduction 
tory — creation, storage, and handling. Electronic
records, however, must be judged by the qualityhis article is a review of the electronic record and
of the electronic record system from which theybusiness record provisions of the Evidence Acts. 1 ToT
come. The system integrity test of the electronicthat end, it is intended to show that:
record provisions is an objective test in that it can1. In the law of evidence concerning records and
be given both definition and application indocuments, the distinction between hearsay and
accord with independent, authoritative standardsbest evidence rule issues is meaningless when
such as the National Standards of Canada con-applied to electronic records. The best evidence
cerning electronic RIM. It sets a threshold ofrule is not needed. The ‘‘system integrity test’’ of
admissibility high enough to effectively judge thethe electronic record provisions of the federal,
quality of the electronic records system fromprovincial, and territorial Evidence Acts is the
which the electronic records in question come.only test needed.
But the ‘‘usual and ordinary course of business’’
2. Therefore, there are three ‘‘procedural’’ reasons test of the business record provisions sets a low
why satisfying the electronic record provisions threshold of admissibility. It is a subjective test
with sufficient evidence should be held to satisfy that accepts the quality of the record system from
the business record provisions as well: (1) the law which the records come as being what must be
reflects the reality that electronic technology accepted as the usual and ordinary course of bus-
needs no distinction between hearsay rule and iness in regard to RIM. Therefore, it cannot be an
best evidence rule issues; (2) it enables procedural effective test of RIM quality. (Only by chance
simplicity, i.e., it is a one-step procedure; and (3) might it be an effective test for judging the
an effective burden of proof is cast where it quality of paper record systems, but not for elec-
should be — upon the party adducing the tronic record systems.) Evidence in satisfaction of
records in question. the higher burden of proof should also satisfy the
3. There is also a substantive reason why evidence lower burden of proof. Therefore, evidence that
that satisfies the electronic record provisions also satisfies the system integrity test of the electronic
satisfies the business record provisions. The record provisions should also satisfy the usual
quality of paper records that have never been in
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The rules on hearsay are generally accepted to presentand ordinary course of business test of the busi-
no special problems for the admission of electronic records.ness record provisions.
The medium on which indirect evidence is stored does not
alter the characteristics of that evidence as hearsay. As a4. Important hearsay issues concerning the business
result, the law dealing with the hearsay aspect of documen-record provisions remain unanswered.
tary evidence has been able to handle electronic records
without difficulty. Indeed, the leading common law case on5. The vagueness and uncertainty of the business
documents, Ares v. Venner, 3 sets out rules that could berecord provisions in the Evidence Acts causes
applied as well to electronic as to paper records. Statutorythese defects: (1) the uncertainty the litigant faces rules on documents have tended to follow. For example, the
as to how they will be applied, meaning uncer- Ontario Evidence Act has a codification of the business
tainty as to what evidence to marshall for court; records rule that defines ‘‘record’’ this way: ‘‘includes any
information that is recorded or stored by means of any(2) inconsistent court decisions; and (3) court
device’’. This kind of thinking led the Uniform Law Confer-decisions that bring back the old common law
ence of Canada to omit rules on hearsay from the Uniformrequirements they were intended to replace. Electronic Evidence Act. 4
6. The fact that the caselaw concerning business
records shows no difficulty in regard to hearsay
issues is not a valid reason for the failure of the
Uniform Electronic Evidence Act (the UEEA), 2 2. UEEA Progeny — The Electronic
and of the Evidence Acts that incorporated it as Record Provisions of thetheir electronic record provisions, to deal with Evidence Acts hearsay issues concerning electronic records.
That caselaw also shows no difficulty in dealing lectronic records5 give rise to a ‘‘best evidence rule’’
with best evidence rule issues. Nevertheless, the issue — that is what the electronic record provisionsE
electronic record provisions were necessary and declare. 6 The best evidence rule states that where a fact
do provide important improvements to the law. or event is to be proved by means of a document or
If the courts are not given issues to decide, the other recording, the ‘‘original’’ of such document or
courts and the caselaw will not decide them. The recording must be used. 7 The electronic record provi-
silence of caselaw does not justify the silence of sions of the Evidence Acts state that electronic records
legislation. The impact of electronic technology satisfy the best evidence rule on proof of ‘‘the integrity of
upon law and practice, and its rapid change, the electronic records system in which the electronic
should lead to the conclusion that legislation is record was recorded or stored’’, referred to as the elec-
needed before the law is demonstrably inade- tronic record ‘‘system integrity test’’. 8 Therefore, in
quate. Otherwise, too much damage is done. regard to electronic records, these provisions substan-
That is why legislating the electronic record pro- tially alter the best evidence rule.
visions was justified, albeit for the reasons argued
Eight of Canada’s 14 jurisdictions have enacted elec-herein, not in their present form.
tronic record provisions that copy the UEEA. 9 New
7. The underlying theory of the usual and ordinary Brunswick added its own unique ‘‘electronic imaging’’
course of business test of the business record pro- provisions to its Evidence Act in 1996, 10 and Quebec had
visions of the Evidence Acts is losing its validity. It the necessary electronic evidentiary provisions in place
is a subjective test providing only a low threshold in the Civil Code of Quebec11 before the electronic
of admissibility. The theory is that good RIM is record provisions of the Canada Evidence Act (CEA)
sufficiently guaranteed by the profit motive. became operative on May 1, 2000, being the first to do so
There are now more reasons why good RIM as Part 3 of the federal Personal Information Protection
might be seen to be contrary to the best interests and Electronic Documents Act (commonly referred to as
of the record keepers. Preventing loss can be PIPEDA). 12 Given that all 14 jurisdictions have enacted
more important than maximizing profit. There- electronic commerce legislation (which, for the common
fore, the ‘‘circumstances of the making of the law jurisdictions, closely copies the ULCC’s Uniform
record’’ test of the business record provisions Electronic Commerce Act (the UECA)), and given that
should be interpreted as though it were a record such UECA legislation needs UEEA legislation with
system, system integrity test comparable to the which to enforce its legal rights and obligations — as all
system integrity test of the electronic record pro- commerce needs appropriate laws of evidence that facili-
visions. The double usual and ordinary course of tate enforcing its laws of commerce — it is surprising
business tests of those provincial Evidence Acts that four jurisdictions have yet to enact UEEA legislation,
that contain this phrase could be given a similar namely, British Columbia, Newfoundland and Labrador,
interpretation. Nunavut, and the Northwest Territories. The answer
Therefore, this article reaches conclusions contrary from those four jurisdictions must be that the business

































































Electronic Records as Documentary Evidence 143
serve electronic records adequately, just as they have issue it as an official record. The electronic record provi-
until now. sions of the Evidence Acts, 20 provide the test for satis-
fying a challenge under the best evidence rule, i.e., is theEven if such an argument were valid, which it is not,
paper printout or other display a reliable reproduction ofit will lead to an unsatisfactory state of the law, which is
its electronic source? They state that the best evidencedescribed below under the heading, ‘‘9. Contradictory
rule in respect of an electronic record is satisfied by proofCaselaw — Civil Versus Criminal Proceedings’’. Any
of the integrity of the electronic records system by or inargument that the business record provisions can ade-
which the record was recorded or stored. If a record isquately serve electronic records is defeated by the very
also challenged under the hearsay rule, its admissibilityexistence of the electronic record provisions, which were
will be tested as well under the business record, bankingenacted because of the serious doubts that the business
record, microfilm record, government record, or otherrecord provisions could adequately serve that purpose. 13
record or document provisions. 21There are advantages brought to the law by those newer
provisions — as analyzed below, which cannot be found Therefore, the law governing the use of records as
in the older business record provisions. evidence in legal proceedings is no longer dependent
upon the preservation of ‘‘original’’ paper documents. InAlthough there are few available decisions that have
satisfaction of the best evidence rule, electronic recordsinterpreted these new electronic record provisions —
are now admissible as evidence dependent upon ‘‘theand none that have added significantly to what these
integrity of the electronic records system in which theyprovisions state themselves14 — there are many older
are recorded or stored’’. 22decisions that deal with best evidence rule issues. In
particular, the decisions in R. v. McMullen15 and R. v. However, that integrity is not defined by the Evi-
Bell and Bruce, 16 although banking record cases rather dence Acts. It is left to the courts and tribunals to deter-
than business record cases, do deal with the best evi- mine whether an electronic records system from which
dence rule issues within subsection 29(2) of the CEA. an electronic record comes has that necessary integrity
Therefore, until newer decisions displace them, they are and to devise their own tests for doing so. As a result, the
very useful in dealing with issues arising from the elec- amendments added to the Evidence Acts to accommo-
tronic record provisions. date electronic records are a compromise between the
desire for certainty in the test to be applied and flexi-The argument that the second of these two deci-
bility in applying it. The wording of the business recordsions overrules the first is not valid, nor is the argument
provisions reflects that same legislative draftingthat the Ontario Court of Appeal has limited McMullen
strategy. 23to its own peculiar facts. 17 Firstly, until a court expressly
states that one of its earlier decisions is overruled, an Although there is no exact, mandatory definition of
opinion that the earlier decision has ‘‘effectively been ‘‘integrity’’ provided to elucidate the system integrity test,
overruled’’ is of dubious value. Secondly, this argument is the following ‘‘presumptions of integrity’’ are provided. 24
based on the statement in Bell and Bruce that, ‘‘The ‘‘In the absence of evidence to the contrary’’, the integrity
authenticity of the record as evidence is sufficiently guar- of an electronic records system by or in which an elec-
anteed by compliance with subsection 2 of section 29’’. 18 tronic record is recorded or stored is proved:
The word ‘‘authenticity’’ is a reference to the authentica- (a) by evidence capable of supporting a finding that at all
tion rule, not to the best evidence rule issues within material times the computer system was operating
properly or, if it was not, the fact of its not operatingsubsection 29(2) of the  CEA. Thirdly, the system integ-
properly did not affect the integrity of the electronicrity test of the new electronic record provisions requires
record and there are no other reasonable grounds towhat McMullen requires. 19 doubt the integrity of the electronic records system;
(b) by whether it is established that the electronic record
was recorded or stored by a party who is adverse in
interest to the party seeking to introduce it; or3. The ‘‘System Integrity Test’’ in
(c) by whether it is established that the electronic recordComparison with Hearsay Rule
was recorded or stored in the usual and ordinary courseIssues of business by a person who is not a party to the
proceedings and who did not record or store it underll legal issues concerning the use of business records the control of the party seeking to introduce it.
as evidence fall into three categories: hearsay issues,A
The phrase ‘‘usual and ordinary course of business’’best evidence rule issues, and authentication issues.
in (c) is also undefined. This very same phrase providesHearsay issues concern the truth of the contents of a
the key test for admissible records in the ‘‘businessrecord. The best evidence rule concerns the reliability of
record’’ provisions, wherein it is also undefined. 25copies, duplicates, and other substitutes for an original
record — for example, is a particular printout a reliable McMullen can be used to argue what standard of
reproduction of its electronic source? Authentication electronic RIM should be required by the system integ-
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ignored, ‘‘McMullen standard’’. Morden J.A., delivering affidavits do not contain detail as to ‘‘the complete
the judgment of the Court, stated: record keeping process’’. The foundation evidence
presented is never that thorough, and the witnesses whoI accept that the demonstration of reliability of com-
adduce such records are seldom cross-examined or oth-puter evidence is a more complex process than proving the
reliability of written records. I further accept that as a matter erwise challenged in argument or by opposing witnesses
of principle a Court should carefully scrutinize the founda- to that high a standard. And so it is that the caselaw that
tion put before it to support a finding of reliability, as a should by now have been well developed and refined,condition of admissibility (see McCormick’s Handbook on
and that should exemplify this landmark decision, doesthe Law of Evidence, 2nd ed. (1972), p. 734), and that the
not exist — not because the courts have chosen to ignoreadmission procedures in s. 30 [CEA] are more fine-tuned
than that in s. 29 [CEA]. However, this does not mean that it, but more likely because counsel appearing before
s. 29(2) is not adequate to the task. The four conditions those courts have ignored it, in both civil and criminal
precedent provided for therein, the last one being that the proceedings. In civil cases the discovery process is used tocopy of the entry offered in evidence is a true copy of what
make the rules of evidence less important. In criminalis in the record, have to be proved to the satisfaction of the
judge. The nature and quality of the evidence put before the cases — being the much greater source of the rules of
Court has to reflect the facts of the complete record keeping evidence because the greater frequency of jury trials
process — in the case of computer records, the procedures makes necessary their development — possibly, insuffi-and processes relating to the input of entries, storage of
cient knowledge of RIM and of electronic technologyinformation, and its retrieval and presentation: see Trans-
leaves counsel unable to effectively attack businessport Indemnity Co. v. Seib (1965), 132 N.W. 2d 871; King v.
State ex rel. Murdock Acceptance Corp. (1969), 222 So. 2d records. Are civil counsel any more knowledgeable? The
393, and ‘‘Note, Evidentiary Problems and Computer National Standards of Canada, written by experts in the
Records’’, 5 Rut. J. Comp. L. 342 (1976), p. 355, et seq. If such records and information management industry and citedevidence be beyond the ken of the manager, accountant or
herein, can serve to educate and structure one’s cross-the officer responsible for the records (R. v. McGrayne,
Ontario Court of Appeal, March 14, 1979 [since reported examination or examination-in-chief in relation to the
46 C.C.C. (2d) 63]) than a failure to comply with s. 29(2) admissibility and weight of business and electronic
must result and the print-out evidence would be inadmis- records, and in fact, all records used as evidence. 27sible.
Accordingly, I do not think that the difference in the Therefore, the above McMullen standard requiring
procedures between ss. 30 and 29 is such as to compel the
proof of ‘‘the facts of the complete record keeping pro-conclusion that s. 29 cannot be applicable to computer
cess’’ can be said to be very similar to the words, ‘‘proofevidence, nor do I think that the potential difficulties of
satisfying s. 29(2) should result in this conclusion. Further, it of the integrity of the electronic records system in or by
may be noted that, at least ostensibly, ss. 29 and 30 do not which the data was recorded or stored’’ in subsec-
operate on the same plane. Section 29 makes the copy tion 31.2(1) of the CEA and subsection 34.1(5.1) of the‘‘prima facie proof’’ while s. 30 makes the record ‘‘admissible
Ontario Evidence Act (OEA). Both are tests of systemin evidence’’. 26
integrity. If the McMullen standard had been developed
The important conclusion to draw from this passage and regularly applied to produce an ongoing body of
is that if electronically produced banking records require caselaw, the electronic record provisions would not have
‘‘proof of the entire record keeping process . . . etc.’’, in been necessary. However, now that they are in existence,
order to gain admissibility under section 29 of the CEA, the evidence that their system integrity test should
then that at the least should be required of electronically require should also be sufficient to satisfy the require-
produced business records under sections 30 and 31.1 to ments of the business record provisions of section 30 of
31.8 of the CEA, given that, (1) banks operate under a the CEA and section 35 of the OEA, as well. Can one
much more demanding regulatory regime than does possibly prove the system integrity of one’s electronic
business in general, and (2) both subsections 29(2) and records system without also proving consequently, (1) its
30(1) of the CEA use the key phrase and test, ‘‘the usual ‘‘usual and ordinary course of business’’, as required by
and ordinary course of business’’. McMullen is not subsection 30(1) of the CEA and subsection 34.1(5) of
binding on any court’s interpretation of the electronic the OEA; and (2) that the ‘‘circumstances of the making
record provisions because it predates them by 21 years of its records’’ also satisfy subsection 30(6) of the CEA —
(1979 to 2000). But it should be considered as being and subsection 35(4) of the OEA, as well, albeit this
persuasive authority in regard to an electronic tech- subsection expressly limits the application of such ‘‘cir-
nology, having no more meaningful differences for the cumstances’’ to issues of ‘‘weight’’?
purposes of legal interpretation than its electronic coun-
terparts at the time of McMullen. A contrary argument would be that evidence of
Similarly, when such foundation evidence is system integrity goes to the issue of whether the record
adduced by way of an affidavit, as allowed under sec- in question has been altered, accidentally or intention-
tions 29(2), 30(6), and 31.6 of the CEA, such affidavits ally, so as to cast doubt on its ‘‘integrity’’, and does not go
should also be able to satisfy the above-mentioned to the issue as to whether the record has been created ‘‘in

































































Electronic Records as Documentary Evidence 145
for example, ‘‘in contemplation of litigation’’, or out of evidence rule issue? ‘‘Truth of contents’’ issues have long
some other potentially corrupting bias or ‘‘oblique been established as hearsay rule issues, and thereby pro-
motive’’? 28 That is, system integrity should be limited to vide the conceptual basis and justification for the rule
the types of defects within the preview of the best evi- against hearsay evidence. But the electronic record provi-
dence rule (for which the system integrity test was cre- sions expressly treat electronic record systems and their
ated), and not those that the hearsay rule and its excep- printouts as creating best evidence rule issues. Is the
tions guard against as well. This restricted, reduced necessary answer that the hearsay rule applies to the
integrity is used in the electronic commerce legislation declarations of human beings and not to those of elec-
pertaining to the ‘‘legal requirements re original docu- tronic devices and the record systems that contain them?
ments’’. 29 If it is not a hearsay rule issue, then what is it? Perhaps,
therefore, is it more correct to consider such as being theBut like the above McMullen standard and accom-
declarations of humans because it is humans who setpanying text, words such as ‘‘integrity’’, when applied to
such electronic systems in motion to make such declara-the whole of a record system, have to require foundation
tions? The answer should be, ‘‘why does it matter howevidence for admissibility that provides a comprehensive
such issues are categorized?’’ The software failure has castdescription of the workings of that RIM system. Integrity
doubt upon the credibility of the contents of its printout.has to be comprehensively applied, for it cannot have
Thus, the technology has blurred the distinctionvalidity piecemeal, i.e., a RIM system cannot have selec-
between hearsay rule and best evidence rule issues, if nottive system integrity, with only some of its parts and
completely removed it. Consequently, so should the law.certifications required to satisfy that standard. An under-
Nevertheless, the electronic record provisions are nowstanding of the National Standards of Canada30 should
part of the Evidence Acts of Canada and must be copedtherefore be necessary.
with. However, the business record provisions were left
As to the effect of Bell and Bruce, 31 it does not untouched by such enactments, thus necessitating a
justify limiting the operation of the McMullen standard ‘‘two-step analysis’’ of the admissibility issues for elec-
to situations wherein the printout is relied upon, inde- tronic records — one step for each set of provisions. The
pendently from the reliability (or integrity) of the elec- steps should have been combined into one. They would
tronic record system in which it is recorded or stored. be, if judicial interpretation holds that satisfaction of the
What Bell and Bruce did at most was to take away the system integrity test also satisfies the tests of the business
possible argument, based upon McMullen, that where record provisions.
the printout remains after its electronic record (its elec-
tronic ‘‘parent’’) has been erased, the printout should not Nonetheless, the electronic record provisions can
be accepted as evidence because it can no longer be serve important purposes. The more capable electronic
proved to be a ‘‘true copy’’ of that original electronic technology becomes, the more complex it becomes.
record. Bell and Bruce holds that the printout is none- Standard procedures become more complex and varied,
theless admissible, regardless the state of its electronic far different in kind, and not merely in degree, than their
parent. However, that does not disturb the applicability pre-electronic counterparts — not merely in the speed
of the McMullen standard in determining the admissi- and volume of intake and output as though electronic
bility of electronically produced records. In this regard, record systems mean nothing more than faster type-
the analysis below under the heading ‘‘7. The ‘Relied writers and adding machines. The McMullen standard is
Upon Printout’ Provisions’’ sets out the competing argu- all the more necessary as that complexity increases, and
ments in regard to those provisions and gives insight into the opponent of admissibility consequently becomes less
the purpose of the electronic record provisions. capable of challenging electronic record systems and
However, that purpose has been removed by the their records. Contrary to this reality, however, the busi-
technology those provisions were enacted to serve — a ness record provisions set a low threshold of admissi-
technology that requires only the hearsay rule and its bility by way of the weak, subjective test — ‘‘the usual
business record exception (and other record exceptions) and ordinary course of business’’ — which is not an
and not the best evidence rule. McMullen and Bell and effective burden of proof for RIM ‘‘quality assurance’’. As
Bruce were decided almost 20 years before the first of a result, an unfair burden of disproving quality assurance
these electronic record provisions came into effect. 32 is cast upon the opponent of admissibility. More compat-
They and the best evidence rule should no longer be ibly with the nature of electronic record systems, the
necessary, being based upon the faulty concept that com- system integrity test of the electronic record provisions
puter software neatly and clearly separates its issues of casts an effective burden of proof upon the proponent of
fact and law into hearsay rule and best evidence rule admissibility. Therefore, the ‘‘circumstances of the
varieties. In fact, electronic record systems irretrievably making of the record’’ test should equally be interpreted
scramble them together. For example, if a software as imposing a similar burden of proving quality assur-
failure casts doubt upon the truth of the contents of a ance upon the proponent as a necessary condition-prece-

































































146 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
tion 30 of the CEA. Although this ‘‘circumstances of the 5. Make destruction of paper-originals optional
making’’ test is expressly barred in its provincial Evi- without impairing the legal status of their elec-
dence Act counterparts from similar application to issues tronic record counterparts in relation to admissi-
of admissibility, 33 their double ‘‘usual and ordinary bility and weight (destruction is assumed to be
course of business’’ tests might be given such application optional because the CEA and OEA provisions
in regard to electronic records. So far however, the are silent on this issue); and
caselaw has made no distinction between the section 30
6. Allow recognition of trading partner agreements(CEA) single ‘‘usual and ordinary course of business’’ test
for electronic data interchange (EDI) that set upand the double variety of the provincial and territorial
binding procedural protocols for transmitting allEvidence Acts. 34 Or, even though expressly barred from
business records electronically, and for settlingpreventing admissibility, such ‘‘circumstances of the
disputes arising from such data interchangemaking’’ tests could be held to impose a similar burden
(s. 31.5 of the CEA; s. 34.1(8) of the OEA).of proving quality assurance as a condition-precedent to
electronic records being given any ‘‘weight’’ as business
Such improvements could have been built into arecords, even if ruled admissible.
single set of provisions dealing with the admissibility and
There are, therefore, three important reasons why weight of electronic records.
satisfying the electronic record provisions with sufficient
As to the hearsay35 rule issue concerning ‘‘the truthevidence should be held to satisfy the business record
of the contents of records’’, the Evidence Acts provideprovisions, as well: (1) the law reflects the reality that
that business records, including government records, areelectronic technology needs no distinction between
admissible as evidence if made in the organization’shearsay rule and best evidence rule issues; (2) it enables
‘‘usual and ordinary course of business’’ (s. 30(1) of theprocedural simplicity, i.e., it is a one-step procedure; and
CEA; and s. 35(2) of the OEA). However, the phrase,(3) an effective burden of proof is cast where it should be
‘‘usual and ordinary course of business’’ is again unde-— upon the party adducing the records in question.
fined. The court or tribunal may have regard to ‘‘the
Quite apart from such caselaw remedies, in compar- circumstances of the making of the record’’ in deter-
ison with the business record provisions, the electronic mining what that usual and ordinary course of business
record provisions provide the following improvements is (s. 30(6) of the CEA and s. 35(4) of the OEA). But there
to the evidentiary law of business records: is no guidance as to the required ‘‘circumstances of the
making of the record’’ — these sections are silent. Never-1. Substitute an evaluation of electronic record
theless, these two undefined phrases provide the testssystem integrity in place of evaluating paper-orig-
that determine whether any particular record is accept-inal documents as a test for determining the
able as evidence. Paper records that have never been keptadmissibility of, and ‘‘weight’’ (probative value;
in electronic form are subject to these ‘‘business record’’credibility) to be given business records (ss. 31.2
provisions alone. 36 These tests, being undefined, make itand 31.3 of the CEA; ss. 34.1(5)–(7) of the OEA) if
important to use national and industry standards such asthey subsume the business record provisions,
the National Standards of Canada, Electronic Records asbecause satisfying the system integrity test will
Documentary Evidence CAN/CGSB-72.34-2005, andsatisfy the tests of the business record provisions;
Microfilm and Electronic Images as Documentary Evi-
2. Expressly encourage the use of national and dence CAN/CGSB-72.11-2000, to give them a RIM con-
industry standards of record-keeping and infor- text for definition, policy, and procedure.
mation management in the determination of
issues of admissibility and weight (section 31.5 of The lack of adequate caselaw for the business record
the CEA; subsection 34.1(8) of the OEA); provisions after 40 years in operation suggests a lack of
awareness of the fundamental differences between elec-3. Abolish retention periods for paper-original tronic and traditional (paper) records management sys-records as a condition-precedent to the admissi- tems. Electronic and paper record systems make neces-bility of their microfilm and imaged counterparts sary a fundamental difference in the concepts upon(the infamous ‘‘ six-year rule ’’; e.g., subsec- which each is admitted into evidence — the differencetions 34(3) and (4) of the OEA to be repealed — between ‘‘electronic records system integrity’’, and thebut such repeal not being necessary for sec- traditional and much older ‘‘proof of the original record’’tion 31 of the CEA because it did not contain a made, ‘‘in the usual and ordinary course of business’’. Isretention period); there too often a willingness by counsel to accept each
4. Give electronic records a legal status equal to that other’s records into evidence on consent? Such practice
of paper-originals in regard to the authentication does not warrant a presumption as to the high degree of
rule and the best evidence rule (ss. 31.1 and 31.2 accuracy, reliability, and trustworthiness of such records.

































































Electronic Records as Documentary Evidence 147
electronic records system management and practice, the The major shortcomings of the law of business
result will become more potentially damaging to one’s records concern the hearsay rule — that is, the condi-
case as electronic technology increases in capability and tions under which a record will be accepted or not
complexity and all business activity becomes completely accepted in proof of the truth of its contents. Those
dependent upon it. Counsel is somewhat at risk when conditions are the recording of acts and events in perma-
using the business record provisions without knowing nent records by means of original entries made close to
something of RIM policy and procedure, and now even the time when they happen, in the routine of business,
more so when having to cope with the electronic record and recorded by persons that have direct, personal
provisions. knowledge of those acts and events, and who are under a
‘‘business duty’’ to make such records with no motive to
misrepresent. 38 These requirements provide the founda-
tion for the legal concept of the ‘‘original’’. Proof of those
business acts and events is to be made by means of that4. The Adequacy of the Business
‘‘original’’ permanent record. This traditional rule isRecord Provisions 
therefore based upon the medium of storage, the original
permanent paper record. Although it is being used now
to admit electronic records into evidence, it is law based(a) The hearsay and best evidence rules
upon pre-computer concepts of record-keeping. There-remain separate rules 
fore, it is neither free from doubt, nor from important
he Evidence Acts that have incorporated the UEEA undecided issues.
do not deal with hearsay rule issues because theT
In contrast, computer systems often use manyUEEA is based upon the assumption that the distinction
storage media for each record. The final or permanentbetween paper and electronic records concerns form but
medium of storage is, more often than not, not the orig-not substance. This assumption means that distinctions
inal medium upon which records were recorded. Noramong the media of storage — whether they be paper,
are such permanent records made close to the time ofelectronic, or optical media — do not affect the truth of
the acts and events so recorded, nor made by the personthe contents of records. Therefore the hearsay rule, being
having direct personal knowledge of the acts and eventsa rule concerning ‘‘truth of contents’’, is not dealt with by
so recorded. Therefore, the integrity of electronically pro-the UEEA because of the mistaken belief that the hearsay
duced and stored business records should be maderule is ‘‘doing fine’’ in relation to records. Rules as to
dependent upon proof of ‘‘record system integrity’’, notauthentication and best evidence concern matters of
proof of original paper records. The law has to reflect thisauthorship, form, and content, other than the truth of
same transition in concept that business RIM has made.their contents. Therefore, they are the substance of the
That is why the UEEA should have dealt with theUEEA.
hearsay rule, so as to make that legal transformation.This distinction between form and substance and
between form and truth of contents, can be challenged
as being overly simplistic. The assumption that the dis- (b) The weaknesses and inadequatelytinction between paper and electronic records affects the answered issues of the business recordform but not the substance (i.e., the truth of contents) of provisions records is wrong. For example, imaged records involve
matters that affect the truth of contents as well as the As a result, the most serious failings of the present
form of records. 37 Similar arguments can be made as to business record provisions in the Evidence Acts remain
other forms of electronic records. The distinction unchanged. They are:
between paper and electronic records concerns all mat-
(1) they fail to inform adequately as to what evi-ters of content as well as form. The distinction between
dence is needed for proof of the truth of busi-form and content, between medium of storage and the
ness records sufficient to render them admis-truth of contents, was valid before there were electroni-
sible in evidence andcally created and stored business records — that is to say,
when all records were traditional paper-original records. (2) they allow court decisions to ride off in all direc-
But now electronic technology has blurred these distinc- tions because the tests they provide are unde-
tions such that trying to separate form from substance, fined and too vague to command consistency in
and medium of storage from the truth of contents is judicial interpretation. 39
illusory and serves no meaningful purpose in law. Simi-
larly, the conceptual distinctions between the hearsay In short, the current law as to the admissibility and
rule and the best evidence rule are obsolete. The UEEA weight of business records is based upon three concepts,
perpetuates such conceptual ‘‘distinctions without a dif- two of which are without fixed definition and the third
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two undefined concepts are, ‘‘the usual and ordinary comparison if called for. 49 Should electronic records
course of business’’, and ‘‘the circumstances of the have the same legal status as their paper originals if those
making of the record’’. They appear in most of the evi- originals are no longer available to verify the accuracy of
dence legislation in Canada. 40 The third is the concept of those electronic descendants, and should printouts have
the ‘‘original’’ record. 41 the legal status of their electronic ancestors or parents
after they have been deleted from their hard drives?The absence of fixed definitions of the key phrases
(Subsection 4(2) of the UEEA deals with this issue, but in‘‘usual and ordinary course of business’’ and ‘‘the circum-
relation to the best evidence rule, not the hearsay rule.stances of the making of the record’’ gives the courts
Software now affects all three rules of admissibilitycomplete flexibility in applying them. But that same flex-
‘‘seamlessly’’ (the hearsay, best evidence, and authentica-ibility leaves litigants and the business community
tion rules) and therefore so should the legal rule deter-uncertain as to what is required to prove business
mining the admissibility of the products of the applica-records as admissible and credible evidence. To aggra-
tion of such software in making and storing electronicvate this unsatisfactory situation, several important
records.)hearsay rule questions about business records as evi-
dence remain unanswered, even with the combined Such unanswered ‘‘hearsay’’ questions could be
assistance of statutory business record provisions and resolved by statute to allow the business record provi-
court decisions interpreting them. Consider the fol- sions to be compatible with electronic business
lowing examples of important questions needing records. 50 Instead, the UEEA perpetuates the best evi-
answers, or new answers, and the conflicting answers dence rule where it is no longer needed.
given by the court decisions cited in their accompanying
notes:
(c) The future of the concept of theWhether the present statutory language requires that
‘‘original’’ record admissible records need only be made by a person under a
‘‘business duty’’ to make such records, or whether the sup-
The third unsatisfactory concept in the present lawplier of the information recorded, as well as the maker of
is that of ‘‘the original’’, i.e., proof of a record requiresthe record must have been acting pursuant to such ‘‘busi-
ness duties’’. 42 For example, a customer using an ATM is not proof of the original record. It is not unsatisfactory
under a business duty to the bank but bank records are thus because it remains vague and undefined, but rather
made by that customer and relied upon by the bank. because it is incompatible with electronic RIM which
Whether s. 30(1) CEA allows for double hearsay and has no such ‘‘original’’. An acceptable original in its pre-
not just single hearsay. Such limitation would arise from the computer form, is one made at or near the time of theopening words, ‘‘Where oral evidence in respect of a matter
events it records — such is the ‘‘contemporaneity’’would be admissible . . . ’’. 43
requirement. This concept of the ‘‘original’’ concerns theWhether it is sufficient if the making of the record was
best evidence rule rather than the hearsay rule, as did thepart of the ordinary routine of the business, or whether not
only the making of the record but also the events being previous two concepts of ‘‘the usual and ordinary course
recorded must be part of the business routine. 44 For of business’’ and ‘‘the circumstances of the making of the
example, making an accident report is business routine, but record’’. The relative simplicity and clarity of the ‘‘orig-the accident is not, unless one’s business is accidents.
inal’’ provides some compensation for the vagueness of
Whether contemporaneity (co-incidence in time) the other two concepts. The best evidence rule states thatbetween the making of a record and the events recorded as
the absence or alteration of the original must be ade-part of the ‘‘usual and ordinary course of business’’ must
quately explained or proof of its admissibility will fail. 51always be required, or at least considered. 45
Whether records are inadmissible because of the An important consequence of moving the law from
interest or bias of the maker of the records, or whether such ‘‘original’’ to ‘‘system integrity’’, that is, from a depen-a requirement is not to be read into the business record
dence upon proof of the integrity of the original businessprovisions of our Evidence Acts, and is merely to be consid-
document, to a dependence upon proof of the integrityered as going to the ‘‘weight’’ of the record if admitted into
evidence. 46 of the RIM system, means that the best evidence rule
loses most or all of its meaning and purpose. That is soWhether admissibility requires detailed evidence of the
RIM system, or merely an examination of the system by an because the same factors that are relevant to applying the
expert witness of the proponent of the records in question. 47 hearsay rule exception for business records will also
Whether business records may contain statements of affect the use of the evidence as equivalent to an original,
opinion. 48 which is a best evidence rule issue. Because the UEEA
The Supreme Court of Canada has held that a com- directs an analysis of such system integrity for purposes
puter printout can be treated as an ‘‘original’’ business of the best evidence rule, and electronically produced
record even if its electronic source has been deleted. records are system-dependent for their integrity in regard
Previously, the hard copy printout was held to be merely to the hearsay rule as well, the UEEA should have so
a copy dependent upon the continued existence of its dealt with the hearsay rule instead of leaving the existing

































































Electronic Records as Documentary Evidence 149
blurs the distinction between form and content and, ordinary course of business’’. If so, any ‘‘circumstances of
therefore, between the hearsay rule and the best evi- the making of a record’’ could be used alone or with
dence rule. The UEEA attempts to preserve pre-com- others to determine whether any business record should
puter concepts for the mere sake of legal continuity from be excluded, whether or not it was made within ‘‘the
past to present even though those concepts, as separate usual and ordinary course of business’’ of the organiza-
concepts, are now obsolete. They need unification into tion from which the record was produced and is being
one principle of system integrity because electronic RIM adduced. A very detailed cross-examination of the chief
systems and electronic technology as a whole, in fact, records officer, or other proponent witness of admissi-
deal with the form and substance of business records as a bility, as to such ‘‘circumstances of the making’’ should
seamless whole. The alternative choices for such reform therefore be imperative. Note that this interpretation
have been reviewed in the consultation papers of the views subsection 30(6) as an exclusionary rule only, and
ULCC.52 The result of those papers and their subsequent not as a rule for admitting as well as excluding records
consultation process has been the UEEA and its incorpo- from evidence.
ration into a majority of the Evidence Acts in Canada, Support for this ‘‘predominance view’’ of subsec-
(beginning with the amendments to the CEA, sec- tion 30(6) over subsection 30(1) of the CEA can be found
tions 31.1–31.8, operative from May 1, 2000). in J. Douglas Ewart, Documentary Evidence in Canada. 56
As to the hearsay issue concerning the truth of the At page 85, footnote 57, the author states:
contents of records, the Evidence Acts provide that ‘‘busi- Subs. 30(6), Canada Evidence Act, supra, note 7. The
ness records’’, which includes government records, are argument that this subsection creates an exclusionary
power, rather than just a power to assess the weight of anyadmissible as evidence if made in the organization’s
particular record, is grounded on the opening words. It‘‘usual and ordinary course of business’’. 53 However, the
seems clear that the words: ‘‘For the purpose of determiningphrase ‘‘usual and ordinary course of business’’ is again whether any provision of this section applies’’ include subs.
undefined. But under subsection 30(6) of the CEA, the (1), which is the foundation of admissibility. The court
court or tribunal may have regard to ‘‘the circumstances should, therefore, be able to use the subs. (6) powers to
determine whether to apply subs. (1), or in other words, toof the making of the record’’ in determining whether to
determine whether or not to admit the record. This inter-accept any record as evidence. And to that end, under
pretation is buttressed by the next following phrase in subs.subsection 30(9) of the CEA: (6): ‘‘or for the purpose of determining the probative value, if
Any person, who has or may reasonably be expected to any . . . ’’. The use of the disjunctive implies that the opening
have knowledge of the making or contents of any record phrase relates to admissibility, rather than just weight.
produced or received in evidence under this section may, Although it could be argued that the subs. (6) examination
with leave of the court, be examined or cross-examined is limited to determining whether the document is
thereon by any party to the legal proceeding. 54 authentic and was made in the usual and ordinary course of
business, it would appear to be open to the courts to takeHowever, in contrast to subsection 30(6) of the CEA,
the broader view that the subsection permits them to decidesubsection 35(4) of the OEA and subsection 42(3) of the whether subs. (1)’s admissibility power ought to be used. If
BCEA limit the use of such ‘‘circumstances’’ to issues of this expanded view does not prevail and all documents
which are found, on a subs. (1) examination, to have been‘‘weight’’:
made in the usual and ordinary course of business and toThe circumstances of the making of such a writing or
concern matters respecting which oral evidence would berecord, including lack of personal knowledge by the maker,
admissible, must be admitted, then it is clear that the courtmay be shown to affect its weight, but such circumstances
can give them no weight at all. See note 58, infra. [emphasisdo not affect its admissibility. 55
in original]
The body of the text containing the references to foot-(d) The two hearsay admissibility tests in
notes 57 and 58 appears under the heading, ‘‘Changessection 30 of the CEA — which is pre- from the Common Law Admissibility Tests: An Over-dominant? view [of s. 30 CEA]’’. It states: 57
Of great importance to the nature of the foundation Also gone is any rigid standard of contemporaneous-
evidence adduced to gain or oppose admissibility of ness. However, departure from this common law standard,
both electronic and traditional paper-original records, is and indeed all others, forms a valid basis for an argument
that the court should use its apparent power to exclude thethe strong argument that subsection 30(6) of the CEA is
record [fn. 57] or at least, pursuant to its undisputedthe predominant test of section 30, rather than the
authority to do so, should give the document little weight.‘‘usual and ordinary course of business’’ test of subsec- [fn. 58]
tion 30(1) of the CEA. Subsection 30(6) makes ‘‘the cir-
Footnote 58 itself states:cumstances of the making of a record’’ applicable to
This approach was adopted by Callaghan Co. Ct. J. (asboth the admissibility of and ‘‘weight’’ given any busi-
he then was) in R. v. Grimba (1977), 38 C.C.C. (2d) 469ness record. Such interpretation means that subsec-
(Ont. Co. Ct.) at 472: ‘‘These are matters which, of course,tion 30(6) is not only an exclusionary rule, but is also would go the weight of the documents and matters which
superior to the admissibility test in subsection 30(1) pro- should be drawn to the attention of the jury’’. The contin-
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weight are in issue was forcefully stated by Morand J. in The Supreme Court of Canada decided that hospital
Aynsley v. Toronto Gen. Hospital, supra, note 8. 58 records were admissible in a medical malpractice case,
And as well, at page 99: the Court stating that judges could restate common law
hearsay exceptions to meet modern conditions — a pro-Then there is the general power in section 30(6) to
consider the record and the circumstances of its making in position rejected by the House of Lords in England a few
deciding its admissibility and weight. years earlier in a decision also turning upon the business
Whereas ‘‘the usual and ordinary course of busi- records exception at common law: Myers v. D.P.P. 64 The
ness’’ is a subjective test, being determined by the nature result of the decision in Ares, as shown by subsequent
of the course of business of the business organization decisions, has been to expand the scope of admissibility
itself, 59 ‘‘the circumstances of the making of the record’’ of the business records exception to the rule against
invites the application of objective and authoritative hearsay evidence at common law, for all business
standards of RIM. Thus National Standards of Canada records. 65
approved by the Standards Council of Canada60 con- Ewart concludes his analysis of the effect of Ares
cerning RIM become applicable in determining the upon the common law exception by listing its resulting
admissibility and weight of business records, under both constituent elements as they stand now, as follows: 66
the business records hearsay rule exceptions in the Evi-
In the result, the modern rule can be said to makedence Acts, and the common law exception as well. The
admissible a record containing (i) an original entry (ii) made
latter uses a comparable phrase, ‘‘in the routine of busi- contemporaneously (iii) in the routine (iv) of business (v) by
ness’’, which equally invites the application of objective a recorder with personal knowledge of the thing recorded as
a result of having done or observed or formulated it (vi) whoand authoritative standards. 61
has a duty to make the record and (vii) who had no motive
to misrepresent. Read in this way, the rule after Ares does
(e) The business records exception to the reflect a more modern, realistic approach for the common
law to take towards business duty records.hearsay rule at common law compared
with its Evidence Act counterparts As Ewart states, the most dramatic change made by
section 30 of the CEA is that it has only two require-Both a statutory and common law business records
ments of admissibility, but the common law exceptionexception to the hearsay rule are available in 12 of
still has as many as seven elements. 67 Subject to what isCanada’s 14 jurisdictions. They have different constit-
set out above as to the ‘‘predominance view’’ of subsec-uent elements, which gives a reason for using them
tion 30(6) over subsection 30(1) of the CEA, ‘‘[u]ndertogether in any legal proceeding wherein there is a statu-
section 30, a record prima facie qualifies for admission if:tory business records exception available. All provincial
(i) it was made in the usual and ordinary course ofand territorial Evidence Acts contain such a provision
business; and (ii) it refers to a matter in respect of whichexcept the Evidence Acts of Alberta and Newfoundland
oral evidence would be admissible’’. 68 This secondand Labrador. Therefore, in proceedings governed by the
requirement arises from the opening words of subsec-provincially enacted laws of Alberta and Newfoundland
tion 30(1) of the CEA: ‘‘Where oral evidence in respect ofand Labrador, only the business records exception at
a matter would be admissible in a legal proceeding’’,common law would be available. However, in proceed-
which words are immediately followed by the firstings based upon federal statutes, the business records
requirement, ‘‘a record made in the usual and ordinaryexception within section 30 of the CEA would apply and
course of business that contains information in respect ofcould be relied upon, along with the exception at
that matter is admissible in evidence under this sectioncommon law. The common law business records excep-
in the legal proceeding on production of the record’’. 69tion was redefined and updated by the Supreme Court
of Canada in Ares v. Venner. 62 Although a full under- Paper records that have never been kept in elec-
standing of the operation of the common law exception tronic form are subject to the statutory and common law
requires a thorough examination of the ‘‘Ares v. Venner hearsay exceptions alone. The electronic record provi-
progeny’’ (all of the subsequent court decisions that have sions of the Evidence Acts would not apply to such
applied this ruling), the following key passage from Ares records. But electronic records would have to be shown
v. Venner itself is sufficient for purposes of this descrip- to be in compliance with them if a best evidence rule
tion of the applicable rules of evidence: 63 objection were raised.
Hospital records, including nurses’ notes, made con-
temporaneously by someone having a personal knowledge
of the matter then being recorded and under a duty to (f) Divergence of theory and practice
make the entry or record, should be received in evidence as under the business record provisions prima facie proof of the facts stated therein. This should, in
no way, preclude a party wishing to challenge the accuracy The theory of the law’s reliance upon tests of admis-
of the records or entries from doing so. Had the respondent sibility and weight, such as ‘‘the usual and ordinaryhere wanted to challenge the accuracy of the nurses’ notes,
course of business’’ and ‘‘the circumstances of thethe nurses were present in Court and were available to be


































































Electronic Records as Documentary Evidence 151
ness’s self-interest to maintain complete and accurate accord with self-interest than maintaining complete and
records. The need to maximize profit is assumed to be accurate records. 70
an unfailing and constant guarantee of complete and Therefore, the test of admissibility should judge not
accurate records and record-keeping systems. But in the record alone, but the record system it comes from.
many situations now, incomplete and inaccurate records The business record provisions require that the record be
are necessary to maximize profits, or at least to minimize judged. The electronic record provisions require that the
losses. For example, there are many more demands for record system be judged. It follows that they should be
production of records by private litigants and govern- combined to create one test that judges the record
ment departments and regulatory agencies than was the system. That can be accomplished by judicial interpreta-
case when the theory, and the present law it supports, tion that holds that evidence that satisfies the system
were created. Often it is more conducive to profit and to integrity test of the electronic record provisions, satisfies
the avoidance of loss to destroy or ‘‘lose’’ embarrassing the business record provisions, as well. Conversely, evi-
and damaging records than to comply with demands for dence that cannot satisfy the system integrity test should
their production. Official agencies such as environ- be held to be insufficient to satisfy the business record
mental, taxing, consumer, labour, and securities authori- provisions. The ‘‘circumstances of the making of the
ties have much greater and more frequently used powers record’’ test in section 30 of the CEA could be given that
to force production of records and disclosure of informa- interpretation on the issue of admissibility and on the
tion, and to conduct their own searches and seizures issue of weight in the business record provisions of the
under expanded legal powers. provincial and territorial Evidence Acts. Similarly, the
double ‘‘usual and ordinary course of business’’ test ofSimilarly, private plaintiffs can use the civil courts to
the latter, 71 could also be given that interpretation on theforce production, disclosure, injunctions restraining com-
issue of admissibility. 72 For both issues, there is no effec-petitive activities, and to obtain an ‘‘Anton Pillar order’’,
tive way of judging the quality of an electronic recordthe civil search warrant. That is, a court order is obtained
system, or of any electronic record, except by means ofthat requires the defendant to allow a search of its
the system integrity test. The electronic record provisionsvarious premises including searches of its computers
confirm and declare that to be so.without prior notice and to allow removal of relevant
materials for deposit with the court. The Anton Pillar
order can authorize searches of any premises including
homes, automobiles, and warehouses, and can require 5. The Tests Applicable tothe target persons to disclose the whereabouts of relevant
Electronic Records as Evidence objects, documents, access procedures, keys, combina-
tions, to allow the taking of photographs and the making he tests applicable to the use of electronic records as
of copies. As well, interlocutory injunctions can be evidence in legal proceedings depend upon threeT
obtained to restrain further activity in relation to various key legal phrases;
products, computers programs, and records facilitating
(1) ‘‘the integrity of the electronic records system’’the business activities being attacked. There now exists
(the ‘‘system integrity test’’);in the civil courts the power to force a business person to
(2) ‘‘the usual and ordinary course of business’’; andassist in his or her own financial demise by being forced
to disclose one’s very own confidential business informa- (3) ‘‘the circumstances of the making of the record’’.
tion and produce one’s own business records, and to The first phrase is found in the ‘‘electronic record’’ provi-
suffer such at the beginning of such litigation and not sions of the Evidence Acts. 73 The second and third are
merely as a result of its unfavourable conclusion. As a found in the ‘‘business record’’ provisions. 74 All three
result, the increasing benefits of failing to keep such must be satisfied for records that are: (1) recorded or
records and to destroy them if they exist puts self-interest stored in an electronic record system; and (2) business
increasingly in conflict with the legal theory as to what records. 75 For records that are ‘‘relied upon printouts’’
are legislated and, therefore, officially represented to be within the meaning of subsection 31.2(2) of the CEA,
adequate legal tests of the integrity of business records. and subsection 34.1(6) of the OEA,76 they too will have
to satisfy the business record provisions of the EvidenceThe exercise of such powers under the law (such as
Acts. These special subsections might be thought of asthe granting of interlocutory injunctions and Anton
providing a fourth key legal phrase.Pillar orders) requires proof, and often the source of that
proof is within the records of the defendant who thus For admissibility of a business record that is elec-
finds his own records used against him. The inducement tronically recorded or stored, one recent decision implies
to destroy records that might operate against one’s inter- that the applicable business record provisions are satis-
ests grows — profit is no longer the sole dictator of RIM fied first, followed by the applicable electronic record
practice. Destroying or otherwise disposing of one’s dam- provisions, as well. 77 Quite likely, proof of the ‘‘integrity
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two key phrases as well, because it appears to be a higher 6. National Standards of Records
and objective standard, and the ‘‘usual and ordinary and Information Management in
course of business’’ is a lower and subjective standard Aid of Admissibility and therefore creates a lower ‘‘threshold of admissi-
bility’’. 78 However, the phrase is too new to the Evidence ecause the Evidence Acts purposely leave undefined
Acts to tell whether the courts will give it that interpreta- the above key phrases in the tests they make appli-B
tion. Whereas ‘‘the usual and ordinary course of busi- cable to records, they therefore provide that for the pur-
ness’’ is a subjective test, being determined by the nature pose of determining under any rule of law whether an
of the course of business of the business organization electronic record is admissible as evidence in legal pro-
itself, 79 ‘‘the circumstances of the making of the record’’ ceedings, evidence may be presented in respect of any
test invites the application of objective and authoritative standard, procedure, usage, or practice concerning the
standards of RIM. Thus, the National Standards of manner in which electronic records are to be recorded
Canada cited herein80 should be used when determining or stored. 84 This ‘‘standards as evidence’’ provision states
the admissibility and weight of business records, under (using the OEA version):
both the statutory business records hearsay rule excep- 34.1. (8) For the purpose of determining under any rule
tions in the Evidence Acts, and the common law excep- of law whether an electronic record is admissible, evidence
may be presented in respect of any standard, procedure,tion, as well. The latter uses a comparable phrase, ‘‘in the
usage or practice on how electronic records are to beroutine of business’’, which equally invites the applica-
recorded or stored, having regard to the type of business ortion of objective and authoritative standards. 81 Given the endeavour that used, recorded or stored the electronic
all-encompassing definition of ‘‘business’’ used in the Evi- record and the nature and purpose of the electronic
dence Acts82 and the pervasiveness now of electronic record. 85
RIM, it is best to consider all records as being subject to Therefore, the National Standard of Canada, Electronic
the above three legal tests. Being qualitative rather than Records As Documentary Evidence, CAN/CGSB
quantitative, these tests are not yet capable of an exact 72.34-2005, 86 is particularly useful in providing rules and
definition or measure. Caselaw applying them has added procedures for RIM, with which to satisfy the Evidence
little so far. 83 Act tests. Those tests, and the national standards created
To add further to the distinction between the objec- to facilitate their application, are meant to be applied as
tive ‘‘system integrity test’’ and the subjective ‘‘usual and much in business and government activities as in legal
ordinary course of business’’ test, note that the latter proceedings. RIM systems should therefore be designed,
phrase appears in the presumptions created by para- initiated, and maintained in accordance with that law
graph 31.3(c) of the CEA and paragraph 34.1(7)(c) of the and those standards.
OEA, which presumptions are part of the electronic
record provisions of those two Evidence Acts. However,
it does not follow that such appearance in both the 7. The ‘‘Relied Upon Printout’’ Pro-electronic record provisions and in the business record
visions provisions thereby equates these two sets of provisions as
being equally subjective or objective and having equal n addition to the above methods by which electronic
‘‘thresholds of admissibility’’. First, only a rebuttable pre- records can satisfy the best evidence rule, there is theI
sumption is created, not an absolute one, as is indicated ‘‘relied upon printout’’. It is a printout that ‘‘has been
by the words ‘‘in the absence of evidence to the con- manifestly or consistently acted on, relied on or used as a
trary’’, which apply to all three presumptions created by record of the information recorded or stored in the
section 31.3 of the CEA and subsection 34.1(7) of the printout’’. 87 The commentary to the UEEA provision,
OEA. In comparison, the definition of ‘‘electronic record subsection 4(2), states:
system’’ in subsection 31.2(2) of the CEA and subsec- The purpose of this Act is to provide for rules for elec-
tion 34.1(5.1) of the OEA, which creates the system integ- tronic records, those produced or stored in a computer or
rity test, is not a mere presumption. Second, the ‘‘usual readable at the time of their use only with the help of a
computer. Many records today are produced using a com-and ordinary course of business’’ test operates in only
puter with word-processing software and then printed. Theone of three presumptions created by section 31.3 of the
electronic file is never used again. Business correspondenceCEA and subsection 34.1(7) of the OEA, and not in all is an example. The record ‘‘lives its life’’ on paper, and the
circumstances involving the application of the electronic paper is presented in evidence. The reliability of the com-
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record to be treated as a paper record. The paper printout suggested above, but the OEA provision comes within
would be the original for the purposes of the best evidence the first interpretation. It would follow that subsec-
rule.
tion 34.1(6) of the OEA creates a paper document (as
It is suggested that there are two interpretations of the though it came from a typewriter) and not an electronic
resulting Evidence Act ‘‘relied upon printout’’ provisions: record, but subsection 31.2(2) of the CEA creates an
electronic record. If the OEA paper document is an orig-1. The printout is not an electronic record because
inal, it satisfies the best evidence rule. If it is a copy, itsit is not used as evidence of what is in the com-
proponent will have to show why a copy should beputer and therefore the reliability of the com-
allowed to be used as evidence in place of its absentputer that generated it is not in issue; and
original. In contrast, subsection 31.2(2) of the CEA2. The printout is an electronic record, and proof of
printout will have to be defended against any attack‘‘reliance’’ upon such printout satisfies the best
upon its electronic source. 90evidence rule; however, ‘‘evidence to the con-
trary’’ concerning the reliability of the computer The second interpretation of the electronic record
would displace the presumption flowing from provisions as an homogeneous whole has the attractions
such ‘‘business reliance’’. 88 of consistency, unity, and simplicity, which makes it
Analysis here gives insight into the essential purpose more likely to be accepted, even if ‘‘mistaken’’, according
of the electronic record provisions as a whole. Note that to the intended interpretation of their drafters. It is the
subsection 31.2(2) of the CEA contains the phrase, ‘‘in first interpretation that was intended by those who pre-
the absence of evidence to the contrary’’, whereas subsec- pared the UEEA for adoption by the Uniform Law Con-
tion 34.1(6) of the OEA and subsection 4(2) of the UEEA ference of Canada, and its CEA and OEA progeny. 91
do not. 89 The theory of the first interpretation is that
There is one case in particular that deals with thisbecause the record lives the whole of its meaningful life
subsection, R. v. Morgan. 92 Those who favour the firston paper, the necessary reliability that satisfies the best
interpretation would argue that the Court in Morgan didevidence rule is to be found in the proof of ‘‘business
not recognize that subsection 31.2(2) CEA describes areliance’’ upon that printout. But there are several argu-
case wherein the printout is not an electronic recordments in support of the second interpretation.
because it is not used as evidence of what is in theAdvocates of the first interpretation would point to
computer, and therefore does not bring the reliability ofthe opening words of sunbsection 31.2(2) of the CEA,
the computer into issue. That analysis of Morgan may‘‘Despite subsection (1)’’, as meaning that the printout is
mean (to those who favour the second interpretation)excepted from the rule in subsection (1), and therefore is
that the subsection will not be widely understood asnot to be considered an electronic record. The OEA
being necessary to an age wherein most documents arecounterpart is in the opening words of subsec-
generated from a word-processing program to live theirtion 34.1(5), ‘‘Subject to subsection (6)’’, which subsec-
effective lives on paper only, and not as proof of whattion provides for the ‘‘relied upon printout’’. But the
was in the computer during such generation — i.e., ifdefinition of ‘‘electronic record’’ in subsection 34.1(1) of
Morgan is wrong in its treatment of subsection 31.1(2) ofthe OEA ends with the words, ‘‘other than a printout
the CEA, many courts will make the same ‘‘mistake’’.referred to in subsection (6)’’. Its CEA counterpart, which
Although legislative history can be used in aid of theis the definition of ‘‘electronic document’’ in sec-
interpretation of statutes, Parliamentary history,tion 31.8, does not contain a comparable qualification.
including the intention of those who drafted the statute
Also, subsection 4(2) of the UEEA and subsec- in question, cannot. 93 Courts are in no way bound to
tion 34.1(6) of the OEA do not say that the ‘‘relied upon’’ find that the Parliament or legislature that enacted the
printout satisfies the best evidence rule, but rather that legislation in question, had the same intention as its
such printout ‘‘is the record for the purposes of the best drafters. 94
evidence rule’’. In contrast, subsection 31.2(2) of the CEA
states that such ‘‘relied upon’’ printout ‘‘satisfies the best Those favouring the first interpretation would argue
evidence rule’’. For subsection 4(2) of the UEEA and that the printout reliance exceptions to the electronic
subsection 34.1(6) of the OEA, the relationship between record provisions, taken as a whole, were meant to pro-
printouts and electronic data is not relevant, as it is for vide for situations wherein the interpretation of records
subsection 31.2(2) of the CEA. This distinction could and settlement of disputes depends entirely upon the
therefore support an argument that subsection 31.2(2) of printout containing such records, as in the case of a
the CEA creates an electronic record that can be attacked printed contract. In such situations, electronic record
by adducing evidence of the unreliability of the elec- system integrity is not involved. In turn, there is no need
tronic record system it came from, whereas subsec- to look for originals or copies and duplicates of such
tion 34.1(6) of the OEA does not create an electronic originals, as the traditional form of the best evidence rule
record that can be so attacked. The CEA provision falls requires. The best evidence rule is thus entirely dis-
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Similarly, it would be argued that the best evidence ments signed with secure electronic signatures’’. Secure
rule does not fit electronically produced records, for electronic signature regulations 99 were published in
there is no true original. The so-called ‘‘copy’’ produced Part II of the Canada Gazette for February 23, 2005. 100
from its electronic parent is just as good as that original. These regulations define the technology and the neces-
Therefore, the best evidence rule has no appropriate sary technical terms. They create a presumption as to
application between them. But it has a meaningful appli- authenticating an electronic document, which states:
cation between any one record and the record system 5. When the technology or process set out in sec-
that produced it. Therefore the UEEA and the electronic tion 2 is used in respect of data contained in an electronic
document, that data is presumed, in the absence of evidencerecord provisions of the Evidence Acts that incorporated
to the contrary, to have been signed by the person who isthe UEEA establish a system integrity test. The best evi-
identified in, or can be identified through, the digital signa-dence rule is satisfied on proof of the integrity of the ture certificate.
electronic record system in which the data was recorded
As allowed by section 31.4 of the CEA, future regu-or stored. 95 This is a substantial alteration of the best
lations could also establish evidentiary presumptions asevidence rule in order to make it applicable to electronic
to the integrity of information contained in electronicrecords.
documents and not only as to their authentication. TheThe contrary argument would be that there is in
OEA, however, does not yet deal with electronic signa-fact a need for a test linking each printout with its elec-
tures. But Ontario’s Electronic Commerce Act, 2000,tronic parent. 96 Software and hardware do fail, casting
contains provisions for the use of electronic signatures indoubt on the integrity of the resulting printout or other
facilitating electronic commerce, (1) section 11 — inoutput from its electronic data or parent. Therefore, all of
place of signatures, endorsements, and seals; and (2) sec-the electronic record provisions should be interpreted
tion 17 — in place of signatures, ‘‘to be provided to awith regard to that critical link — the ‘‘lifeline of record
public body’’. 101integrity’’.
Does whichever interpretation is adopted make a
difference? — only in so far as it makes the reliability of
the electronic record system that generated the printout 9. Contradictory Caselaw — Civil
a relevant issue, and thus provides a way of countering Versus Criminal Proceedings 
the ‘‘relied upon printout’’ method of satisfying objec-
tions based upon the best evidence rule. Even the elec- n unsatisfactory state of the law now exists because
tronic records of small businesses should have to live not all jurisdictions in Canada have enacted elec-A
with that. tronic record provisions. 102 Caselaw conflicts seem inevi-
table. In criminal proceedings in all jurisdictions ofIronically, Ewart, 97 writing in 1984 — and therefore
Canada, electronic records will be treated as giving riselong before the electronic record provisions began to be
to a best evidence rule issue that defines printouts asadded to the Evidence Acts, beginning May 1, 2000 —
copies of their electronic parents, and a hearsay issue asused the same distinction between the ‘‘relied upon
to the accuracy of what is stated in the printout, becauseprintout’’ and the printout that is looked upon as a copy
both the electronic record and business record provi-of a record kept within the computer system, to distin-
sions of the CEA must be satisfied to gain admissibility.guish the two most important decisions of the Ontario
But in civil proceedings in those four jurisdictions thatCourt of Appeal as to the test for the admissibility of
do not yet have electronic record provisions in theircomputer printouts under the business records provi-
Evidence Acts, they will be treated as giving rise to asions of the Evidence Acts. 98
hearsay issue alone. Before the electronic record provi-
sions were enacted both issues were treated as giving rise
to a single hearsay issue to be determined under the
8. Electronic Signatures business record provisions of the applicable Evidence Act
or under the common law business record exception toovernment agencies may soon adopt electronic sig- the hearsay rule. 103 That will be the first source of con-nature technology allowing for electronic recordsG flicting caselaw — the categorizing of the issues of admis-and documents to be transmitted with secure electronic sibility.signatures. Therefore, in addition to all the above parts of
the ‘‘electronic record’’ provisions, section 31.4 of the The second source is the difference in the legal tests
CEA provides for the making of regulations establishing applicable to determine admissibility. The business
presumptions of evidence in relation to electronic docu- record provisions use the key phrases, ‘‘the usual and
ments signed with secure electronic signatures, ordinary course of business’’ and ‘‘the circumstances of
‘‘including regulations respecting (a) the association of the making of the record’’. The electronic record provi-
secure electronic signatures with persons; and (b) the sions use a ‘‘system integrity test’’, as stated in the key


































































Electronic Records as Documentary Evidence 155
which the record is recorded or stored’’. Thus, the elec- be open to the courts to take the broader view that the
tronic record provisions set a much more demanding subsection permits them to decide whether subsec-
standard than do the business record provisions. As tion (1)’s admissibility power ought to be used. If this
described above, it is an objective standard whose inter- expanded view does not prevail and all documents
pretation is guided by National Standards of Canada, which are found, on a subsection (1) examination, to
particularly Electronic Records as Documentary Evi- have been made in the usual and ordinary course of
dence. It requires an assessment of the worth (‘‘integrity’’) business and to concern matters respecting which oral
of the whole record system from which the electronic evidence would be admissible must be admitted, then it
record in question comes. In contrast, the business is clear that the court can give them no weight at all.
record provisions set a much lower threshold of admissi- Secondly, the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v.
bility in that they require merely proof that the record in Starr105 has held that hearsay evidence that cannot meet
question was made in accordance with whatever is the the ‘‘necessity’’ and ‘‘reliability’’ tests of the ‘‘principled
authenticating organization’s ‘‘usual and ordinary course approach to the admissibility of hearsay evidence’’ must
of business’’. This is a very subjective test that does not be excluded, even though such hearsay comes within an
require an assessment of the whole record system. As a established exception to the hearsay rule. And con-
result, cases wherein an electronic record provision is versely, it can be admitted if it satisfies those tests, even
applicable should be much more demanding of the though it does not come within an established excep-
record system involved than cases wherein a business tion. The ‘‘reliability’’ test can be argued to require an
record provision alone is applicable. A caselaw conflict as examination of the record system that generated the
to the threshold of admissibility is to be expected. record. Although the analysis in Starr concerned the
‘‘traditional exceptions’’ to the hearsay rule and not statu-There are, however, two legal arguments that may
tory exceptions such as the business record provisions ofdiminish these conflicts. Firstly, in criminal proceedings,
the Evidence Acts, it can be argued that Starr is equallysubsection 30(6) of the CEA can be argued to require an
applicable to statutory exceptions as well. The majorityexamination of the record system from which the record
judgment of Iacobucci J. contains the followingcomes, for it allows ‘‘the circumstances of the making of
paragraphs that link the ‘‘principled approach’’ to thethe record to be examined’’. It connects such words to its
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms:106opening phrase, ‘‘For the purpose of determining
whether any provision of this section applies’’. This sup- Why the Exceptions Must be Rationalized
ports an argument that subsection 30(6) not only creates [199] As I have already discussed, a fundamental con-
an exclusionary power, but also that it is superior to cern with reliability lies at the heart of the hearsay rule. By
subsection 30(1) which contains the admissibility test, ‘‘a excluding evidence that might produce unfair verdicts, and
by ensuring that litigants will generally have the opportu-record made in the usual and ordinary course of busi-
nity to confront adverse witnesses, the hearsay rule serves asness’’. This construction would allow any particular ‘‘cir-
a cornerstone of a fair justice system.cumstance of the making of a record’’ to be grounds for
[200] In Khan, Smith, and subsequent cases, this Courtexcluding a record, even though it was proved to have
allowed the admission of hearsay not fitting within an estab-been made ‘‘in the usual and ordinary course of busi- lished exception where it was sufficiently reliable and neces-
ness’’. This argument was well put by J. Douglas Ewart sary to address the traditional hearsay dangers. However,
more than 20 years ago. 104 this concern for reliability and necessity should be no less
present when the hearsay is sought to be introduced under
The argument that this subsection creates an exclu- an established exception. This is particularly true in the
criminal context given the ‘‘fundamental principle of justice,sionary power, rather than just a power to assess the
protected by the Charter, that the innocent must not beweight of any particular record, is grounded on the
convicted’’: R. v. Leipert, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 281 at para. 24,opening words. It seems clear that the words, ‘‘For the 112 C.C.C. (3d) 385, 143 D.L.R. (4th) 38 quoted in R. v.
purpose of determining whether any provision of this Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 at para. 71, 139 C.C.C. (3d) 321,
section applies’’ include subsection (1), which is the foun- 180 D.L.R. (4th) 1. It would compromise trial fairness, and
raise the spectre of wrongful convictions, if the Crown isdation of admissibility. The court should, therefore, be
allowed to introduce unreliable hearsay against the accused,able to use the subsection (6) powers to determine
regardless of whether it happens to fall within an existingwhether to apply subsection (1), or in other words, to exception.
determine whether to admit the record. This interpreta-
[201] In addition to improving trial fairness, bringingtion is buttressed by the next following phrase in subsec- the hearsay exceptions into line with the principled
tion (6), ‘‘or for the purpose of determining the probative approach will also improve the intellectual coherence of the
value, if any. . .’’. The use of the disjunctive implies that law of hearsay. It would seem anomalous to label an
approach ‘‘principled’’ that applies only to the admission ofthe opening phrase relates to admissibility, rather than
evidence, not its exclusion. Rationalizing the hearsay excep-just to weight. Although it could be argued that the
tions into the principled approach shows that the former aresubsection (6) examination is limited to determining simply specific manifestations of general principles, rather
whether the document is authentic and was made in the than the isolated ‘‘pigeon-holes’’ referred to in U. (F.J.), supra,
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graph introduces yet another concept, of the reliability of aThe ‘‘principled approach’’ to the hearsay exceptions has
presumption (in effect, of reliability)! The Uniform Act triedthus been made a constitutional principle of trial fair-
to stay away from the word, if not the concept.
ness. Therefore it is superior to any statutory provision
such as the record and document provisions of the CEA In defence, the necessary answers are as follows:
— being a Charter argument it would be applicable only First, it is not entirely correct to say of McMullen that
in criminal proceedings. 107 It can therefore be used to ‘‘This case has, however, been little followed since then’’.
request an examination of the reliability of a record, and In fact, it has received almost no ‘‘judicial treatment’’ at
therefore of the record system it came from, whether or all (except in Bell, as described above113). McMullen has
not the application of section 30 CEA results in a finding neither been rejected nor ignored. It has not been cited
of that record’s admissibility or inadmissibility. because the issue that it deals with has not been sub-
mitted for decision. That issue asks: what should the
foundation evidence be for admitting electronic records
into evidence? John Gregory’s statement that McMullen
10. Answering John Gregory’s ‘‘has, however, been little followed’’ implies that
Attack McMullen has been rejected. The Ontario Court of
Appeal did not expressly do so, and the Supreme Courtn his very helpful article, ‘‘Canadian Electronic Com- of Canada has neither overruled nor distinguished it.merce Legislation’’, 108 John Gregory states under theI McMullen is still good authority for the McMullen stan-heading, ‘‘Electronic Evidence’’, and its subheadings, ‘‘(a) dard that it promulgates, as elucidated above.Principles of Documentary Evidence and Their Reform
(i) Hearsay’’ (at 329): Second, Mr. Gregory asks, ‘‘Why should it [the law]
investigate the inner workings of a computer?’’ The. . . However, documentary evidence has at common law
been admitted on the ground that the manner in which it is answer is, because it has to. The type of record system
created gives a ‘‘circumstantial guarantee of trustworthi- analysis required for judging the accuracy and reliability
ness’’. 109 of a record from an electronic record system cannot be
Electronic documents may tend to reopen the debate, the same as that required for a traditional (pre-computer)however. The impermanence and the malleability of infor-
paper record system. The concepts of RIM are very dif-mation in electronic form make some electronic records
ferent and therefore the conditions-precedent for admis-unreliable. Others are, of course, thoroughly trustworthy,
and technology offer many ways to give different degrees of sibility must be different. The law must reflect the
assurance to them. It has been argued in Canada that the change in technology. Technological changes do not
combination of electronic records and the restatement of always require changes in the law, but in this case such isthe law of hearsay makes it necessary to develop new rules
necessary. For example, traditional paper record systemsfor the admission of such records in their character as
hearsay. If these records are unreliable in different ways, gave rise to, and therefore can satisfy, the legal concept of
then their reliability is a hearsay issue in a way it was not ‘‘an original record’’. But in electronic record systems
when that law was more bound in categories. there is no such ‘‘original’’. The printout taken to court is
The main proponent of this point of view is Ken produced at the end of the record system’s functions and
Chasse, who is much published on electronic evidence activities, not at the beginning — not at the time of theissues. 110 He would prefer that the courts examine in detail
acts or events it records, and not by a person havingthe circumstances of the creation and retention of electronic
records. The recommendations of his 1994 paper echo the ‘‘direct personal knowledge’’. And the other conditions-
procedures of the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. precedent of the traditional admissibility rule have no
McMullen. 111 This case has, however, been little followed electronic counterpart, either. Therefore, a new rule ofsince then.
admissibility is necessary.
The argument on the other side is twofold. First, the
law does not investigate the actual abilities of the human That is why the law should investigate the inner
beings that keep records, in order to apply the business workings of electronic record systems. Their technologyrecords rule. Why should it investigate the inner workings
is completely incompatible with the traditional form ofof a computer? Second, ‘‘[t]he required circumstantial guar-
legal analysis which looks for ‘‘an original record’’ andantee of trustworthiness flows from the presumption that
businesses will create systems which ensure the reliability of demands proof in the continuity of its handling until it
their records. The nature of those systems, whether they arrives in court as a proposed piece of evidence. This
involve computers or human beings, does not affect the traditional form of legal analysis reflected a traditionalreliability of that presumption’’. 112 (We are not talking here
paper record technology that made no distinctionof records created with the prospect of litigation.)
between ‘‘a record’’ and the medium upon which it isAs noted, the Uniform Electronic Evidence Act tends to
stored, which was invariably paper or microfilm. To usethe latter argument, at least in respect of hearsay, rather than
Ken Chasse’s more demanding recommendations. The ‘‘a record’’ meant to use its paper or microfilm manifesta-
debate is a reminder of the difficulty caused by using the tion. But for electronic record systems, the distinction
same word ‘‘reliability’’ in several different contexts. It does between ‘‘a record’’ and its medium of storage is thenot mean the same thing, or involve the same tests, when
foundational concept of their existence and fundamentalwe are talking about authentication or best evidence. The


































































Electronic Records as Documentary Evidence 157
record’’ to examine, what should the necessary rule of The technology of electronic record systems does not
admissibility require examination of? — the electronic need it, and in fact, stands in contradiction of it. As
record system itself, and as a unified whole, because that argued above, the best evidence rule should be abol-
is the RIM concept upon which it is based. The ished. There is not only no benefit in the form of ‘‘legal
McMullen standard declares it to be so, and so do the continuity’’ gained from perpetuating its existence, but
National Standards of Canada concerning electronic also it is damaging to both the substantive and proce-
RIM, being standards created by experts in the RIM dural aspects of the law of evidence, as argued above.
industry.
In short, these arguments do not address the funda-Third, John Gregory’s argument assumes the cor- mental difference between electronic record systems andrectness of the presumption that the profit motive is a traditional paper record systems. As a result, the UEEA
sufficient guarantee of accurate and reliable records. As perpetuates old legal concepts into a realm of new RIM
argued above, the presumption itself should be ques- technology. They do not fit and they will not work. The
tioned. law has been made unnecessarily complicated, and the
Fourth, John Gregory’s arguments are based upon pre-existing problems produced by the business record
the perpetuation of the best evidence rule into the realm provisions of the Evidence Acts have not been fixed. An
of electronic record systems, and maintaining the distinc- opportunity for much-needed law reform has been, if
tion between hearsay rule and best evidence rule issues. not completely missed, at the least, inadequately used.
Notes:
1 The electronic record provisions referred to are sections 31.1 to 31.8 of the and OEA are very similar because both copy the UEEA, ibid. Note that
Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5 (the ‘‘CEA’’), and section 34.1 of there are two parts to these definitions of ‘‘system’’: (1) the computer
the Evidence Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.23 (the ‘‘OEA’’). The business record system in which data is recorded and stored; and (2) any procedures
provisions are section 30 of the CEA, and section 35 of the OEA. The relating to recording and storage.
Evidence Act of Ontario is used herein to exemplify similar provisions in 6 Subsection 34.1(5) of the OEA, supra note 1, states: ‘‘Subject to subsectionthe Evidence Acts of the other common law jurisdictions in Canada, only (6), [the ‘‘relied upon printout provision’’] where the best evidence rule isbecause it is not practical to cite comparable provisions in all of the other applicable in respect of an electronic record, it is satisfied on proof of theprovincial and territorial Evidence Acts, as well as the Articles of Book 7, integrity of the electronic record’’. Subsection 31.1(1) of the CEA, supra‘‘Evidence’’, of the Civil Code of Quebec. note 1, states: ‘‘The best evidence rule in respect of an electronic docu-
2 The electronic record provisions of the Evidence Acts are close copies of ment is satisfied (a) on proof of the integrity of the electronic documents
the Uniform Electronic Evidence Act (the ‘‘UEEA’’), which was adopted by system by or in which the electronic document was recorded or stored, or
the Uniform Law Conference of Canada (the ‘‘ULCC’’) in 1998. The (b) if an evidentiary presumption establish under section 31.4 applies’’.
UEEA, along with its helpful section-by-section commentary, can be Section 31.4 of the CEA provides for the making of regulations to establish
downloaded from the ULCC Web site at: <http://www.ulcc.ca/en/us/ evidentiary presumptions in relation to electronic documents signed with
index.cfm?sec=1&sub=1u2>. secure electronic signatures. See below, the heading, ‘‘7. Electronic Signa-
tures’’.The ULCC is made up of representatives of the federal and provincial
governments. Many of these representatives have responsibility for pre- 7 R. v. Cotroni; Papalia v. R., [1979] 2 S.C.R. 256, 45 C.C.C. (2d) 1 [Cotroni
paring amendments such as incorporating the UEEA into the federal, and Papalia].
provincial, and territorial Evidence Acts and Ordinances. The purpose of 8 See subsection 31.2(1) of the CEA, supra note 1, and subsection 34.1(5.1) ofthe ULCC is to bring about common legislation on subjects of mutual
the OEA, supra note 1.federal and provincial interest. The main mechanism used is drafting
model pieces of legislation. Therefore, the UEEA, being such an intended 9 Supra note 2.
model Act of draft legislation, has become part of the Evidence Acts and 10 S.N.B. 1996, c. 52, ss. 47.1, 47.2.Ordinances across Canada with little alteration from its present form.
Bill C-6, the Personal Information and Protection of Electronic Docu- 11 See Articles 2831, 2837–2841, 2870, and 2874 of the Civil Code of
ments Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5, and Ontario Bill 11, Red Tape Reducation Act, Quebec, L.Q. 1991, c. 64; and An Act to establish a legal framework for
S.O. 1999, c. 12, Sched. B, both good examples of this process, became the information technology, R.S.Q., c. C-1.1.
electronic record provisions of their respective Evidence Acts. The ULCC 12 Supra note 2.is almost 100 years old. As a result of its work, the Evidence Acts are very
similar from one province or territory to the next. 13 The UEEA, supra note 2, and its commentary describe the workings of
each of its sections. But they provide no statement of foundation prin-3 [1970] S.C.R. 608, 14 D.L.R. (3d) 4, 12 C.R.N.S. 349 [Ares v. Venner, cited to
ciple as to the purpose or need for the UEEA other than to state that:C.R.N.S.].
(1) an electronic record should be judged by judging the electronic4 ‘‘Canadian Electronic Commerce Legislation’’ (2002) 17 Banking & record system in which it is recorded or stored; and (2) the law should be
Finance Law Review 277, online: <http://pages.ca.inter.net/~euclid1/ neutral as to the media of storage so that storage may be dictated by
bflr2002.pdf> at 328. business needs and purposes. There is no commentary as to the interac-
5 Subsection 34.1(1) of the OEA, supra note 1, states: ‘‘ ‘electronic record’ tion of the UEEA with the business record exceptions to the hearsay rule
means data that is recorded or stored on any medium in or by a computer in the Evidence Acts and at common law. Many commentators have
system or other similar device, that can be read or perceived by a person pointed out the serious deficiencies of the business record provisions in
or a computer system or other similar device, and includes a display, general, and quite apart from their application to electronic records. The
printout or other output of that data, other than a printout referred to in most detailed of these commentaries is provided by J. Douglas Ewart,
subsection (6)’’. [A record within subsection 34.1(6) is intended to be a Documentary Evidence in Canada (Toronto: Carswell; 1984) [Ewart], at
record relied upon apart from its electronic source — see supra note 81.] 80–110, which, in spite of its age, still provides the best treatment of
An ‘‘electronic records system’’ is defined by subsection 34.1(1) of the OEA evidentiary issues concerning records and documents.
as including ‘‘the computer system or other similar device by or in which 14 See R. v. Gratton, [2003] A.J. No. 1078 (Alta. Q.B.); R. v. Bellingham, [2002]data is recorded or stored, and any procedures related to the recording A.J. No. 476 (Alta. P.C.).and storage of electronic records’’. Section 31.8 of the CEA, supra note 1,
contains very similar definitions, except the CEA uses ‘‘document’’ wher- 15 (1979), 100 D.L.R. (3d) 671, 47 C.C.C. (2d) 499 at 506 (Ont. C.A.)
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16 (1982), 35 O.R. (2d) 164, 65 C.C.C. (2d) 377 (Ont. C.A.) [Bell and Bruce, 33 For example, subsection 35(4) of the OEA, supra note 1, states: ‘‘The
cited to C.C.C.], aff’d, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 287. circumstances of the making of such a writing or record, including lack
of personal knowledge by the maker, may be shown to affect its weight,17 Both arguments are made by Ewart, supra note 13, at 134 and 120.
but such circumstances do not affect its admissibility’’. To similar effect is
18 Supra note 16, at 380. subsection 42(3) of the Evidence Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 124 [BCEA], and
most of the other provincial and territorial Evidence Acts use this same19 This comparison is further developed under the next heading — ‘‘3. The
form for their business record provisions.‘System Integrity Test’ in Comparison with Hearsay Rule Issues’’.
34 For example, subsection 35(2) of the OEA, supra note 1, states: ‘‘Any20 Supra note 1.
writing or record made of any act, transaction, occurrence or event is21 For example, there are at least 20 document provisions in the CEA. admissible as evidence of such act, transaction, occurrence or event ifTherefore, a notice stating that it is intended to use documentary evi- made in the usual and ordinary course of any business and if it was in thedence should not be acceptable if it does not specify which provision(s) usual and ordinary course of such business to make such writing oris/are to be used. Each has its own constituent elements and specified record at the time of such act, transaction, occurrence or event or withinways of satisfying the hearsay, best evidence, and authentication issues a reasonable time thereafter’’. The underlying purpose is to require notraised by such intended evidence. A contained statement that it is only the making of the record, but also the event so recorded to beintended to adduce documentary evidence pursuant to the Canada Evi- within ‘‘the usual and ordinary course of business’’ of the business indence Act is therefore not adequate, even if copies of the documents question. For example, an accident report of a train wreck made by aaccompany the notice. railway employee would satisfy the first but not the second requirement
22 See subsection 31.2(1) of the CEA, supra note 1, and subsection 34.1(5.1) because the railway is not in the business of railway accidents: Palmer v.
of the OEA, supra note 1. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 63 S.Ct. 477 (1943), being a case found in most
Canadian evidence textbooks to exemplify the purpose of the double23 Given the history of the business record provisions, it is now a strategy of
phrase, which was copied from comparable U.S. legislation. However,dubious worth. Many important issues remain to be decided in relation
such limitation upon the compass of the double phrase in subsec-to these provisions, even though they have been in the Evidence Acts for
tion 35(2) of the OEA was expressly rejected in Setak Computer Servicesmore than 40 years — see below, ‘‘4. The Adequacy of the Business
Corp. v. Burroughs Business Machines Ltd. (1977), 15 O.R. (2d) 750,Record Provisions’’.
76 D.L.R. (3d) 641 (Ont. H.C.J.) [Setak, cited to D.L.R.], wherein Griffiths J.24 See section 31.3 of the CEA, supra note 1, and subsection 34.1(7) of the stated (at 650): ‘‘With respect, I believe that Palmer imposes an unreason-
OEA, supra note 1. able and unnecessary limitation on the wording of the enactment. To
draw a distinction between records relating to the principal business and25 See subsection 30(1) of the CEA, supra note 1, and subsection 35(2) of the
those relating only to an auxiliary feature of the business, is not justifiedOEA, supra note 1.
by the plain wording of the section. So long as the records are made in26 [Emphasis added] McMullen, supra, note 15, at 506. the usual and ordinary course of some phase of the business, whether
27 National Standards of Canada are written by standards-development principal or auxiliary, they should be admitted, in my view, according to
agencies accredited by the Standards Council of Canada (SCC). Draft the plain meaning of s. 36 [now s. 35]’’. However, Setak did not involve a
standards are submitted to the SCC for its approval, and then published ‘‘record made in contemplation of litigation’’ as in Palmer v. Hoffman.
by the development agency. The function of the SCC is to ensure that 35 ‘‘Hearsay’’ means a statement offered in evidence to prove the truth ofthe formal, established process for developing standards has been fol-
the matter asserted within it, but made otherwise than in testimony atlowed. The national standards cited herein are those of the Canadian
the proceeding in which it is offered: R. v. O’Brien, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 591,General Standards Board (CGSB), particularly, its newest electronic
(1977), 35 C.C.C. (2d) 209 [O’Brien, cited to S.C.R.] at 593-94.records standard, Electronic Records as Documentary Evidence — CAN/
CGSB-72.34-2005, and its narrower predecessor, Microfilm and Elec- 36 In addition to the ‘‘electronic record’’ and ‘‘business record’’ provisions in
tronic Images as Documentary Evidence — CAN/CGSB-72.11-1993 the Evidence Acts, there are also provisions applicable to government
(amended to Apr., 2000). See also infra note 86. These standards were records, to banking records, and to microfilm records. But all are subject
written by committees composed of experts from the records and infor- to the provisions concerning electronic records if the records in question
mation management field, including legal advisers. They may be pur- are in electronic form (ss. 31.1 to 31.8 of the CEA, supra note 1; s. 34.1 of
chased from the CGSB’s Web site: <http://www.ongc-cgsb.gc.ca>. the OEA, supra note 1).
28 This contrary argument was put to me by John Gregory, General 37 Imaging includes microfilmed and scanned records. It includes RIM
Counsel, Policy Division, Ministry of the Attorney General (Ontario), and procedures such as the use of erasable and non-erasable disks; indexing
see also his further contributions infra notes 50, 52, 91, and 108. Given and retrieval software quality; preparation of documents for scanning;
that the key phrases of the electronic record provisions await judicial scanning resolution; image compression; image enhancement;
interpretation, just as the key phrases of the business record provisions encrypting; quality assurance; scanner testing; verification of index data;
still await definitive judicial interpretation, the whole field of possible backup and recovery procedures; the care, handling, and storage of disks;
interactions between both sets of provisions remains open. hardware and software dependence; security measures; and generally all
29 The electronic commerce legislation includes section 11 of the UECA, of the biographical and bibliographical data (now a variety of ‘‘meta
‘‘Provision of Originals’’, which states (in relevant part): data’’) which is essential to the use of all business records, both paper and
electronic. Imaging procedures should be guided by the National Stan-11. (1) A requirement under [enacting jurisdiction] law that
dard of Canada, Microfilm and Electronic Images as Documentary Evi-requires a person to present or retain a document in original
dence CAN/CGSB-72.11-1993 (amended to Apr., 2000).form is satisfied by the provision or retention of an electronic
document if 38 For an analysis and more exacting statement of the conditions-precedent
to admissibility of business records, both under the business record provi-(a) there exists a reliable assurance as to the integrity of the
sions of the Evidence Acts and at common law, see: Ewart, supra note 13,information contained in the electronic document from the
at 44–69, and 80–110; Ares v. Venner, supra note 3, and the cases thattime the document to be presented or retained was first
have applied it.made in its final form, whether as a paper document or as
an electronic document; 39 For example, compare the decisions in such cases as: McMullen, supra
note 15; Bell and Bruce supra note 16; R. v. Vanlerberghe (1976), 6 C.R.(2) For the purpose of paragraph (1)(a),
(3d) 222 (B.C.C.A.); Setak, supra note 34; Re Waltson Properties Ltd.(a) the criterion for assessing integrity is whether the informa- (1977), 17 O.R. (2d) 328 (Ont. Sup. Ct. (Bank. & Ins. Div.)) [Waltson];tion has remained complete and unaltered, apart from the Tecoglas Inc. v. Domglas Inc. (1985), 51 O.R. (2d) 196 at 205 (Ont. H.C.).introduction of any changes that arise in the normal course Also compare the decisions that have applied to business records theof communication, storage and display; Supreme Court of Canada’s rewriting of the hearsay rule in Ares v.
(b) the standard of reliability required shall be assessed in the Venner, supra note 3, and even more dramatically the Court’s ‘‘principled
light of the purpose for which the document was made and exception’’ to the hearsay rule as developed in its celebrated troika of: R.
in the light of all the circumstances. v. Khan, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531, (1990), 59 C.C.C. (3d) 92; R. v. Smith, [1992]
2 S.C.R. 915, 75 C.C.C. (3d) 257; and R. v. B. (K.G.), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 740,30 Supra note 27.
79 C.C.C. (3d) 257. In 2000, this ‘‘principled approach to the admissibility31 Supra note 16. of hearsay evidence’’, was made the predominant exception for docu-
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2 S.C.R. 144, 147 C.C.C. (3d) 449, 190 D.L.R. (4th) 591 [Starr]. See infra 52 In a paper, as part of the 1995 proceedings of the Uniform Law Confer-
note 83, for a more detailed explanation of this point. ence of Canada (the ULCC), entitled: ‘‘Proposals for Uniform Electronic
Evidence Act’’, by John D. Gregory of the Ministry of the Attorney Gen-40 See, for example, subsections 30(1) and (6) of the CEA, supra note 1, and eral of Ontario and Ed Tollefson, Q.C., of the federal Department ofsubsections 35(2) and (4) of the OEA, supra note 1. While these OEA Just ice ,  onl ine :  <http ://www.ulcc .ca/en/poam2/index .c fm?provisions contain a double ‘‘usual and ordinary course of business’’ test, sec=1995&sub=1995ad>, under the heading, ‘‘Problems With Computer-the CEA provisions contain a single test, and whereas the CEA makes the Produced Evidence’’ (paras. 89 to 99), the authors conclude:‘‘circumstances of the making of the record’’ relevant to both admissi-
bility and weight, the OEA counterpart in subsection 35(4) expressly [99] The conclusion that one can reach is that the provisions of
restricts the relevance of such ‘‘circumstances’’ by the words, ‘‘may be the Canada Evidence Act do not provide a particularly comfort-
shown to affect its weight, but such circumstances do not affect its able fit for computer-produced evidence. They were not pre-
admissibility’’. pared with the computer in mind, so their terminology is inap-
propriate or ill-defined. Having been prepared with the objective41 Before computers were used to create and store business records, the
of resolving particular problems, the relevant sections of the Actwords ‘‘record’’ and ‘‘document’’ could be used interchangeably because
reveal inconsistencies of approach and unwarranted overlappingall records were in the form of paper documents. Separating the concepts
which affects all forms of documentary evidence, not just com-of the content of a record from the medium upon which it was stored
puter-produced evidence.made necessary the use of a different word for each, that is, ‘‘record’’ for
the content of the record and ‘‘document’’ for the medium upon which Similarly, in a paper written for the 1994 proceedings of the ULCC,
it was stored or written. Similarly, ‘‘data’’ makes a ‘‘record’’ which, when ‘‘Computer-Produced Records In Court Proceedings’’, (Ken Chasse,
stored on paper, becomes a ‘‘document’’. Then, to ruin this neat tax- o n l i n e :  < h t t p : / / w w w . u l c c . c a / e n / p o a m 2 / i n d e x . c f m ?
onomy, the CEA uses ‘‘document’’ in its electronic record provisions, sec=1994&sub=1994ac>), I concluded (at para. 82):
while most of the other Evidence Acts use ‘‘record’’. The CEA, however,
● The current rule has several areas of uncertainty that the case-by-uses ‘‘record’’ in its business, banking, and microfilm record provisions.
case development of the law will not resolve for years.
42 See, for example, the following decisions: R. v. Felderhof (2005), C.C.C.
● Many solicitors have difficulty advising their clients about the(3d) 34, [2005] O.J. No. 4151 (Ont. S.C.) [Felderhof]; Setak, supra note 34;
proper conduct of their businesses because of uncertainty aboutWaltson, supra note 39; Matheson v. Barnes & I.C.B.C., [1981] 1 W.W.R.
the use of electronic records in litigation.435 (B.C.S.C.); Adderley v. Breamer, [1968] 1 O.R. 621 (Ont. H.C.)
[Adderley]; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. ● A very liberal use of electronic evidence may be unfair to someone
Obodzinsky, [2003] F.C.J. no. 370 (F.C.A.); R. v. Monkhouse, [1987] A.J. wishing to attack the reliability of the evidence; the onus of proof
1031 (Alta. C.A.); Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. J.L. (2003) of reliability should be on the proponent of evidence and not on its
39 R.F.L. (5th) 54, [2003] O.J. 1722 (Ont. S.C.) [Catholic Children’s Aid]. opponent.
43 R. v. Gregoire (1998), 130 C.C.C. (3d) 65 (Man. C.A.); R. v. Grimba and ● Current rules are based on inconsistent statutes and thus create a
Wilder (1977), 38 C.C.C. (2d) 469 (Ont. Co.Ct.); R. v. Martin (1977), 8 C.R. diversity of law across Canada. Caselaw is not capable of resolving
(5th) 246 (Sask. C.A.); R. v. Wilcox (2001), 152 C.C.C. (3d) 157 (N.S.C.A.) this in the short run.
[Wilcox]; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Ober-
● National and industry standards for the proper use of computerlander, [1999] 1 F.C. 88, [1998] F.C.J. No.1380 (T.D.); Canada (Minister of
technology are widely accepted and do not inspire fear of undulyCitizenship and Immigration) v. Skomatchuk, [2006] F.C.J. No. 926 (T.D.);
limiting the technology or systems to which they apply.Sunila (1986), 26 C.C.C. (3d) 331 (N.S.S.C.) [Sunila]; R. v. Marini, [2006]
O.J. No. 4057 (S.C.J.); R. v. Baker (1977), 35 C.C.C. (2d) 314 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. 53 For example, subsection 30(1) of the CEA, supra note 1, subsection 35(2)
Scheel (1978), 42 C.C.C. (2d) 31 (Ont. C.A.) [Scheel]. of the OEA, supra note 1, and subsection 42(2) of the BCEA, supra note
33.44 Setak, supra note 34; Aynsley v. Toronto General Hospital, [1968] 1 O.R.
425 (Ont. H.C.) affirmed [1969] 2 O.R. 829, affirmed [1972] S.C.R. 435 54 CEA, supra note 1.
(sub nom. Toronto Gen. Hospital Trustees v. Matthews) [Aynsley]; 55 Subsection 35(4) of the OEA, supra note 1.Adderley, supra note 42; Palter Cap Co. Ltd. v. Great West Life Assurance
Co., [1936] O.R. 341, [1936] 2 D.L.R. 304 (Ont. C.A.); Conley v. Conley, 56 Supra note 11. In spite of its age, this book still contains the best available
[1968] 2 O.R. 677, 70 D.L.R. (2d) 352 (Ont. C.A.); B.C. v. Harris, [2003] treatment of the hearsay rule and best evidence rule issues arising from
B.C.J. No. 1897 (B.C.S.C.); Newmarket (Town) v. Halton Recycling Ltd., electronic and pre-electronic records — see generally chapters 2 and 3,
[2006] O.J. No. 2233 (Ont. S.C.); R.obb v. St. Joseph’s Health Care Centre, pp. 44–119). The chapter titles and subheadings are, chapters 2, ‘‘The
[1999] O.J. 523 (Ont. Ct. G.D.) [Robb]; Catholic Children’s Aid, supra note Admissibility of Records Made Pursuant to a Business Duty’’, having
42; Johnson v. Lutz et al. (1930), 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517 (C.A. of New three major subdivisions, which are, ‘‘1. The Common Law Business
York); Palmer v. Hoffman, supra note 34. Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule’’, (pp. 44–69); and ‘‘2. The Business Duty
Rule under the Uniform Evidence Act’’, (pp. 69–74), which is a reference45 Felderhof, supra note 42; Setak, supra note 34; Vanlerberghe, supra note
to the Uniform Evidence Act in Appendix 4, pp. 541–603, that concludes39; R. v. West, [2001] O.J. 3413 (Ont. S.C.) [West]; Robb, ibid; Re: S.V.,
the Report of the Federal/Provincial Task Force on Uniform Rules of[2002] S.J. No. 714 (Sask. Q.B.) [Re: S.V.].
Evidence, (Toronto: Carswell; 1982) [Federal/Provincial Task Force],46 Northern Wood Preserves Ltd. v. Hall Corp. Shipping, [1972] 3 O.R. 751, being a report of the Uniform Law Conference of Canada, and ‘‘(3) The
aff’d. 2 O.R. (2d) 335 (Ont. CA.); Setak, supra note 34; R. v. Biasi (No. 2) Continuing Availability of the Common Law Exception’’ (pp. 74-75). And
(1981), 66 C.C.C. (2d) 563 (B.C.S.C.); R. v. McLarty (No. 3) (1978), for chapter 3, ‘‘Statutory Provisions Governing Business Records’’, which
45 C.C.C. (2d) 184 (Ont. Co. Ct.); West, ibid. chapter provides a detailed analysis of the ‘‘American Origins of the
Canadian Statutory Business Records Provisions’’, and therefore of the47 Compare McMullen, supra note 15, with Vanlerberghe, supra note 39;
constituent elements of section 30 CEA, and of the ‘‘provincial enact-note the difference when expert testimony is used as in Vanlerberghe.
ments’’, and lastly of, ‘‘The Provisions of the Uniform Evidence Act’’. As48 Felderhof, supra note 42; R. v. Laverty (No. 2) (1979), 47 C.C.C. (2d) 60 these headings should imply, in these chapters substantial support can be
(Ont. C.A.); Robb v. St. Joseph’s Health Care Centre, [1999] O.J. 2003 found for the above opinion that there are an unacceptably large number
(Ont. S.C.); Catholic Children’s Aid, supra note 42; Re: S.V., supra note 45. of important, unanswered questions as to the interpretation and opera-
tion of section 30 of the CEA and its provincial and territorial counter-49 Compare McMullen, supra note 15, with Bell and Bruce, supra note 16.
parts (see notes 38 to 45 and accompanying text). See also, supra note 59.50 A contrary opinion as to the state of hearsay issues attendant to electronic
57 Ibid., p. 85.records is given by John D. Gregory, in, ‘‘Canadian Electronic Commerce
Legislation’’ supra note 4 at 328 et seq., whereat the author states: ‘‘The 58 Note 8 accompanies the text (at p. 77) which states: ‘‘Although some may
rules on hearsay are generally accepted to present no special problems for see the various statutory provisions as pre-emptive codes, it is important
the admission of electronic records’’. For further quotation from and to be aware that courts have frequently been willing to impose interpreta-
analysis of this article, see infra note 108 in part 10, ‘‘Answering John tions, particularly limiting interpretations, based on the earlier common
Gregory’s Attack’’. And in regard to John Gregory himself, see also notes law rules’’. The content of note 8 itself states: ‘‘Palmer v. Hoffman, 318
28, 52, and 91. U.S. 109 (1943) is an excellent example of this approach. In Aynsley v.
51 The Supreme Court of Canada’s most recent formulation of the best Toronto Gen. Hospital, [1968] 1 O.R. 425, affirmed [1969] 2 O.R. 829,
evidence rule is now more than 25 years old: see Cotroni and Papalia, affirmed [1972] S.C.R. 435 (sub nom. Toronto Gen. Hospital Trustees v.
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admissibility under the statute but stating, ‘in dealing with the question licence and its conditions, and produced two affidavits attested to by the
of weight the Judge will apply all of the old rules of evidence which have Acting Licensing Administration. Flynn, Prov’l. Ct. J., held that the elec-
stood the test of centuries’’’. tronic record provisions of the Canada Evidence Act cannot by them-
selves admit a document into evidence. Admissibility must be found by59 Ewart, supra note 11, and accompanying text, discusses the subjective
way of some other rule such as the business record provisions of sec-nature of the ‘‘course of business’’ test as an aspect of the ‘‘dramatic
tion 30 of the CEA. The electronic record provisions merely answer anychange from the common law position’’ (at 84) made by section 30 of the
objection based upon the best evidence rule. Note that subsec-CEA. He states of this dramatic change (at 85): ‘‘Gone is the requirement
tions 31.2(1) and (2) of the CEA were accepted as being alternative meansthat there be a strict duty to a third person; instead, a record made by
of answering such objections — see paras. 23 and 26.anyone conducting a business or undertaking, employer or sole propri-
etor as well as employee or casual assistant, is prima facie admissible if In addition, there is the authentication rule. Subsection 34.1(4) of the
made in the usual and ordinary course of that business or undertaking. OEA states: ‘‘The person seeking to introduce an electronic record has
The standard is subjective to the business; admissibility is measured in the burden of proving its authenticity by evidence capable of supporting
relation to the usual and ordinary course of the in question’’. a finding that the electronic record is what the person claims it to be’’.
Section 31.1 of the CEA uses a similar wording.60 Supra note 22.
61 Ewart, supra note 13, at 53, whereat the author provides a comparative 78 As to the ‘‘usual and ordinary course of business’’ being a subjective test,
list of the constituent elements of the common law rule, and the ‘‘Impact subjective to the business from which the record in question comes, see
of Ares’’ [Ares v. Venner, supra note 3] upon each of the constituent Ewart, supra note 13, at 85; and supra note 38; see supra note 56 for
elements of the common law rule by way of a comparative listing of the comments on Ewart.
‘‘Traditional Rules’’ that made up the common law hearsay exception 79 Ewart, supra note 13, discusses the subjective nature of the ‘‘course ofbefore Ares (in left hand column) with the ‘‘Impact of Ares’’ upon each of
business’’ test as an aspect of the ‘‘dramatic change from the common lawthem (in the right hand column). A useful discussion of these points can
position’’ (at 84) made by section 30 of the CEA. He states of thisalso be found in Federal/Provincial Task Force, supra note 56 at 390–401
dramatic change (at 85): ‘‘Gone is the requirement that there be a strict(being ss. 29.11 & 29.12 of the Report), and elsewhere whereat the
duty to a third person; instead, a record made by anyone conducting adecision in Ares v. Venner, supra note 3, is discussed. In the context of
business or undertaking, employer or sole proprietor as well as employeecriminal proceedings and generally in relation to the Canada Evidence
or casual assistant, is prima facie admissible if made in the usual andAct, see: E.G. Ewaschuk, Criminal Pleadings and Practice in Canada, 2nd
ordinary course of that business or undertaking. The standard is subjec-ed. (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2006), at para. 16:15110, ‘‘Business
tive to the business; admissibility is measured in relation to the usual andrecords’’.
ordinary course of the business in question’’.62 Supra note 3.
80 Supra note 27.63 Ibid., at 363.
81 Supra note 13, at 53; see supra note 61.64 [1965] A.C. 1001, [1964] 2 All E.R. 881, 48 Cr. App. R. 348 (H.L.).
82 See the definitions of ‘‘business’’ in the business record provisions: subsec-65 See, for example, Davie Shipbuilding Ltd., v. Cargill Grain Ltd. (1975),
tion 30(12) of the CEA, supra note 1; and subsection 35(1) of the OEA,10 N.R. 347 (S.C.C.) at 358; C.P.R. v. City of Calgary, [1971] 4 W.W.R. 241
supra note 1.(Alta. C.A.) at 257-58; and Setak, supra note 34 at 755.
66 Ewart, supra, note 13, at the top of page 54, and the same list appears at 83 The ‘‘electronic record’’ provisions of the federal and provincial Evidence
84, note 55, under the heading, ‘‘Changes from the Common Law Acts date from May 1, 2000, when sections 31.1–31.8 CEA became opera-
Admissibility Tests: An Overview’’. For the detailed analysis of how Ares tive, and are therefore too new to have accumulated defining court
v. Venner redefined and updated the common law business records decisions. Other than Morgan, supra note 77, the two other available
exception to the hearsay rule, see: Ewart at 48–54; and for a detailed decisions that refer to the electronic record provisions provide no anal-
analysis of the differences between this redefined common law exception ysis; see: Gratton, supra note 14, at paras. 108 to 125; Bellingham, supra
and the business records exception provided by s. 30 of the CEA, see note 14 at paras. 26 to 28.
82–105.
The ‘‘business record’’ provisions date from the late 1960s, but still have67 Ewart, supra note 13, at 84-85. not produced judicial decisions that clearly define or exemplify their
two key tests sufficiently so that one knows exactly what foundation68 Ibid.
evidence to marshall in preparation for legal proceedings. However, the69 CEA, supra note 1. following decisions provide a representation of the available caselaw that
70 For a helpful analysis of the spoliation doctrine in Canada, along with a elucidates the issues; see: McMullen, supra note 15; Bell and Bruce, supra
review of the caselaw to 1998, see: Craig Jones, ‘‘The Spoliation Doctrine note 16; Wilcox, supra note 43; R. v. Penno (1977), 35 C.C.C. (2d) 266,
and Expert Evidence in Civil Trials’’ (1998) 32 U.B.C. L. Rev. 293–325. 76 D.L.R. (3d) 529, 37 C.R.N.S. 391 (B.C.C.A.); Scheel, supra note 43; R. v.
Bicknell (1988), 41 C.C.C. (3d) 545 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Sanghi (1972),71 Of the 10 Evidence Acts that use the ‘‘usual and ordinary course of
6 C.C.C. (2d) 123, at 128–132 (N.S.C.A.). Pre-existing the business recordbusiness’’ phrase in their business record provisions, five use the double
provisions of the Evidence Acts is the business record exception to thephrase, namely the Evidence Acts of British Columbia, Manitoba, Nova
rule against hearsay evidence at common law, which may still be usedScotia, Ontario, and Saskatchewan.
together with its Evidence Act counterpart; see: Ares v. Venner, supra72 In regard to electronic records, no cases could be found that would note 3; Monkhouse, supra note 42; Sunila, supra note 43. A third route
prevent these interpretations of the business record provisions. And more to admissibility as evidence is by way of the ‘‘principled exception to the
importantly, these suggested interpretations are not overly venturesome, rule against hearsay evidence’’, which exception is explained in Starr,
but rather both necessary and modest when compared to the great supra note 39, (particularly paragraphs 199–201, reproduced infra, in
modernization the Supreme Court of Canada has brought to the hearsay part 9 ‘‘Contradictory caselaw — civil versus criminal proceedings), and
rule and its exceptions; see the Court’s decisions cited supra note 35, and modified by R. v. Khelawon, [2006] S.C.J., No. 57, 2006 SCC 57, and
infra note 76. exemplified for records as admissible hearsay evidence by, Wilcox, supra
note 43, at paras. 59 to 76.73 Section 31.2 of the CEA, supra note 1, and subsections 34.1(5), (5.1) of the
OEA, supra note 1. That many of the uncertainties of section 30 of the CEA have yet to be
74 Section 30 of the CEA, ibid, and section 35 of the OEA, ibid. Note that resolved was also the conclusion of Ewart, supra, note 13, in 1984. He
‘‘business’’ includes all types of commercial and institutional activity states (at 83): ‘‘Finally, perhaps because of the breadth of its intended
including that of governments. impact, section 30 contains a number of significant ambiguities, many of
which have yet to find definitive resolutions. The section is not an easy75 In Quebec, instead of appearing within an Evidence Act, comparable
one to interpret; there remains a considerable degree of understatementprovisions can be found in the Articles of the Civil Code of Quebec,
in the sentiments expressed by Pennell J. of the Ontario Supreme Court(Book Seven, ‘‘Evidence’’), L.Q., 1991, c. 64, and in An Act to Establish a
early on in the life of section 30: ‘I have engaged in infrequent safarisLegal Framework for Information Technology, R.S.Q., c. C-1.1.
into [section 30’s] various subsections and I have found an exploration of76 Both supra note 1. the whole sweep of the section is one not altogether free of difficulty.’
77 See R. v. Morgan [2002] N.J. No. 15 (Nfld. Prov. Ct.), at paras. 6 and 20 to [Re Martin and R. (1973), 11 C.C.C. (2d) 224 (Ont. H.C.) at p. 230]’’. It is
27. Morgan was charged with violating a fishing licence condition. A suggested that not only has this state of caselaw affairs not changed since
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important issues can still be said of the business record provisions of the by providing substantial critical analysis and helpful comment upon the
provincial and territorial Evidence Acts, as well. more ‘‘legal content’’ parts (particularly section 5, ‘‘Legal requirements for
electronic records as documentary evidence’’) of the new National Stan-84 See: section 31.5 of the CEA, supra note 1, and subsection 34.1(8) of the
dard of Canada, Electronic Records as Documentary Evidence CAN/OEA, supra note 1.
CGSB-72.34-2005, (supra notes 27 and 86), during the dozens of our
85 Note the words, ‘‘under any rule of law’’, which mean that subsec- meetings of the Canadian General Standards Board’s Committee on
tion 34.1(8) of the OEA, supra note 1, and section 31.5 of the CEA, supra Micrographics and Image Management that drafted the standard. See
note 1, apply not only to the electronic record provisions, but also to further notes, 25, 46, 48, and 102.
issues of the admissibility of electronic records under the business record
92 Supra note 77.and banking record provisions, and other document provisions of the
Evidence Acts, and also to their common law counterparts. Also, subsec- 93 In Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 11th ed. (London: Sweet &
tion 34.1(3) of the OEA states that, ‘‘a court may have regard to evidence Maxwell; 1962), at p. 25: ‘‘Lord Halsbury states however, that he has, on
adduced under this section in applying any common law or statutory more than one occasion, said that the worst person to construe a statute
rule relating to the admissibility of records’’. Even though this provision is is the person who is responsible for its drafting, for he is much disposed
a copy of subsection 2(2) of the UEEA, supra note 2, it has not a counter- to confuse what he intended to do with the effect of the language which
part in the CEA. in fact he has employed’’. Cited in support are: Hilder v. Dexter, [1902]
86 ‘‘CAN/CGSB-72.34-2005’’ is its designation in Canada’s National Stan- A.C. 474; Herron v. Rathmines, etc., [1892] A.C. 498, 501. The passage
dards System, which states that it is standard ‘‘72.34’’, developed by the continues on page 26: ‘‘But it is unquestionably a rule that what may be
Canadian General Standards Board (the CGSB) and approved in 2005 by called the parliamentary history of an enactment is not admissible to
the Standards Council of Canada, the coordinating body of the System. explain its meaning. Its language can be regarded only as the language of
The CGSB, a government agency within Public Works and Government the three Estates of the realm, and the meaning attached to it by its
Services Canada, has been accredited by the Standards Council of framers or by individual members of one of those Estates cannot control
Canada as a national standards development organization. The process the construction of it. Indeed, the inference to be drawn from comparing
by which such national standards are created and maintained in Canada the language of the Act with the declared intention of its framers would
is described within the Standard itself. See also supra note 27. be that the difference between the two was not accidental but inten-
tional’’.87 See: subsection 31.2(2) of the  CEA, supra note 1; and subsection 34.1(6)
of the OEA, supra note 1. 94 It is the intention of Parliament (in regard to the CEA amendments), or of
the enacting legislature (in the case of a provincial or territorial Evidence88 Consider whether evidentiary inferences are created by subsection 4(2) of
Act or other legislative amendment) that should guide judicial interpreta-the UEEA. It appears to create an evidentiary inference by way of the
tion, not that of legislative draftspersons or those who aided in thewords, ‘‘is the record for the purposes of the best evidence rule’’. And
preparation of the Bill before it became a legislated Act: R. v. Hassel-more definitely so do the words in subsection 4(1), stating that ‘‘the best
wander, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 389, 81 C.C.C. (3d) 471, at 478; United Nurses ofevidence rule . . . is satisfied in respect of the electronic record on proof of
Alberta v. Alberta (A.G.), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 901, 71 C.C.C. (3d) 225 at 258, 89. . . ’’. The Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, s. 25(1) states: ‘‘Where an
D.L.R. (4th) 609. More recently in, R. v. W.(R.E.) (2006), 79 O.R. (3d)enactment provides that a document is evidence of a fact without any-
1 (Ont. C.A.) Rosenberg J.A., in delivering the judgment of the Court, inthing in the context to indicate that the document is conclusive evidence,
interpreting paragraph 39(1)(d) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, S.C.then, in any judicial proceedings, the document is admissible in evidence
2002, c. 1, referred (at p. 12) to the statement of the Minister of Justice onand the fact is deemed to be established in the absence of any evidence
introducing the Act on second reading, and (at p. 13) to the testimony ofto the contrary’’. (There does not appear to be a comparable provision in
Professor Nicholas Bala before the House of Commons’ Standing Com-the Ontario Interpretation Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.11.) For such purposes, is
mittee on Justice and Human Rights (February 16, 2000, at 1545) inthere a distinction between the wording of subsections 4(2) and (1) —
determining the intention of Parliament. But there is no resort to thebetween ‘‘for the purposes of the best evidence rule’’ and ‘‘the best
views of lawyers who drafted or otherwise prepared the Bills that becomeevidence rule is satisfied’’? The enacted counterparts in section 31.2 of the
Acts, except in the form of testimony before a Parliamentary committee.CEA, supra note 1, and subsections 34.1(5),  (6) of the OEA, supra note 1,
use the same two phrases, but subsection 31.2(2) of the CEA also contains One of the most important examples of differences between drafters’
the words, ‘‘in the absence of evidence to the contrary’’, while subsec- intentions and the courts’ interpretation of federal legislation applicable
tion 34.1(6) of the OEA does not. to criminal proceedings is the ‘‘Milgaard procedure’’ under subsec-
tion 9(2) of the CEA (‘‘previous statement of witness not proved89 Supra note 2.
adverse’’), which was held to result in leave to cross-examine one’s own90 This distinction between printout and its electronic source was actually
witness on an inconsistent statement before the jury, instead of suchrecognized by the courts almost 20 years before the electronic record
cross-examination being only a voir dire procedure in aid of seeking aprovisions were enacted; see McMullen, supra note 15, affirming
declaration of adversity under subsection 9(1) of the CEA: R. v. Milgaard42 C.C.C. (2d) 67 (Ont. H.C.); Bell and Bruce, supra note 16. Specifically,
(1971), 2 C.C.C. (2d) 206, at 221 (Sask. C.A.), leave to appeal to the S.C.C.in Bell and Bruce, Weatherston J.A., delivering the judgment of the
refused (1972) 4 C.C.C. (2d) 566n. This Milgaard procedure for subsec-Ontario Court of Appeal stated (at 380): ‘‘McMullen is authority for the
tion 9(2) of the CEA, was quoted with implied approval in R. v. McInroyproposition that information stored in a computer is capable of being a
and Rouse, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 588, 42 C.C.C. (2d) 481, at 485-86, and 496‘record kept in a financial institution’, and that the computer print-out is
(concluding paragraph of the decision of Martland J. approving of thecapable of being a copy of that record, notwithstanding its change in
cross-examination allowed under subsection 9(2)). See also, Professorform. It is not authority for the proposition that the stored information is
Ron Delisle’s earlier article (Judge Delisle as he then was), ‘‘Witnesses —the only record, or that a computer print-out is only a copy of that
Competence and Credibility’’ (1978) 16 Osgoode Hall L.J. 337, atrecord’’. [emphasis in the original] And at 381: ‘‘There was some sugges-
345–47, whereat he reproduces portions of the testimony of the Ministertion that one of the banks had the new ‘on-line’ system, under which the
of Justice, John Turner, and of the Director of the Criminal Law Section,information stored in the computer is not, or is not necessarily, erased
John Scollin (later Mr. Justice Scollin of the Manitoba Court of Queen’swhen a monthly statement is produced. I do not consider that to be
Bench), before the Standing Committee for Justice and Legal Affairs onimportant. There is no reason why a bank may not have a ‘record’ in two
January 28, 1969 (at 109–12), being testimony in support of the Bill thator more different forms, just as it might have a duplicate set of books’’.
added subsection 9(2) to the CEA. This testimony is cited in support of
91 The first interpretation is that favoured by John D. Gregory, General the author’s view that (at 345), ‘‘despite R. v. Milgaard, supra, the cross-
Counsel, Policy Division, Ministry of the Attorney General (Ontario) examination mentioned in subsection 9(2) ought to take place on a voir
(And see: www.euclid.ca). He acted as Chair of the committee that pre- dire’’. The same view is put forward by Professor Delisle in an earlier
pared the Uniform Electronic Evidence Act (the UEEA) for the Uniform article, ‘‘Witnesses — Now and Later’’ (1976) 34 C.R.N.S. 1, at 7-8, which
Law Conference of Canada (the ULCC), and therefore later had compa- view was adopted by Langdon J. in R. v. Cronshaw and Dupon (1976),
rable responsibility for bringing to life the electronic record provisions of 33 C.C.C. (2d) 183 at 201 (Ont. Prov’l. Ct.), quoting from the article.
the OEA. The other two participants in drafting the UEEA were federal 95 Subsection 4(1) of the UEEA; subsection 31.2(1) of the CEA, supra note 1;Department of Justice lawyers, who also aided in preparing the electronic
subsection 34.1(5.1) of the OEA, supra note 1.document provisions of the CEA, being Part 3 of the Personal Informa-
tion Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5 [‘‘PIPEDA’’], 96 However, the hearsay rule may provide a more appropriate test than the
Parts 2 (‘‘Electronic Documents’’) and Part 3 (‘‘Amendments to the best evidence rule.
Canada Evidence Act’’) came into force on May 1, 2000, supra note 2.
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98 See: McMullen, supra note 15; Belland Bruce, supra note 16. Ewart makes 104 Supra note 13, at 85, note 57 of Ewart’s text.
the distinction (supra, note 13 at 134) that in the case of the ‘‘relied upon 105 Supra note 39.printout’’, Bell and Bruce ‘‘effectively overrules’’ the McMullen standard,
(which distinction is not agreed with). Specifically, in Bell and Bruce, 106 Being Part I, Constitution Act, 1982, enacted by the Canada Act 1982
Weatherston J.A., delivering the judgment of the Ontario Court of (U.K.), c. 11 R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 44, proclaimed in force
Appeal, stated (at 380): ‘‘McMullen is authority for the proposition that April 17, 1982 (hereinafter, ‘‘the Charter’’).
information stored in a computer is capable of being a ‘record kept in a
107 The ‘‘fair trial’’ provision of the Charter, paragraph 11(d), applies only to,financial institution’, and that the computer print-out is capable of being
‘‘Any person charged with an offence’’.a copy of that record, notwithstanding its change in form. It is not
authority for the proposition that the stored information is the only 108 Supra note 4. For other references to its author, see notes 28, 50, and 91.record, or that a computer print-out is only a copy of that record’’.
[emphasis in the original] And at 381: ‘‘There was some suggestion that 109 Note 279 in the original text: ‘‘In the words of Wigmore on Evidence,
one of the banks had the new ‘on-line’ system, under which the informa- cited in J.D. Ewart, Documentary Evidence in Canada, supra note 270, at
tion stored in the computer is not, or is not necessarily, erased when a 13. Compare the language of the Civil Code of Quebec, [citing articles
monthly statement is produced. I do not consider that to be important. 2 8 3 7  a n d  2 8 3 8 ] .  T h e  C o d e  i s  o n l i n e  a t :  < h t t p : / /
There is no reason why a bank may not have a ‘record’ in two or more www.lexum.umontreal.ca/ccq/en/index.html>’’.
different forms, just as it might have a duplicate set of books’’.
110 Note 280 in the original text: ‘‘See for example his opening contribution99 SOR/2005-30, registered February 1, 2005. to the Uniform Law process, ‘Computer-produced Records in Court
100 Vol. 139, no. 4; pages 207–211. Note that section 57 of PIPEDA, supra Proceedings’, [1994] Proceedings of the Uniform Law Conference,
note 2, added subsection 32(2) to the CEA, supra note 1, which states o n l i n e  a t :  < h t t p : / / w w w . u l c c . c a / e n / p o a m 2 / i n d e x . c f m ?
that copies of documents published in the Canada Gazette are admis- secW1994&subW1994ac>’’.
sible in evidence as proof, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, of 111 Note 281 in the original text: (1978), 42 C.C.C. (2d) 67, affirmed (1979),the originals and of their contents.
47 C.C.C. (2d) 499, 25 O.R. (2d) 301, 100 D.L.R. (3d) 671 (Ont. C.A.).101 S.O. 2000, c. 17.
112 Note 282 in the original text: ‘‘Ewart, Documentary Evidence in102 See notes 9 and 10 supra, and accompanying text.
Canada, supra, n. 270, at 67’’.103 See Ares v. Venner, supra note 3, and the cases that have applied it to
issues concerning business records as evidence. 113 Supra note 84.
✄
R
E
M
O
V
E
U
se
rn
am
e:
 s
hi
rle
y.
sp
al
di
ng
D
at
e:
 2
7-
N
O
V
-0
7
T
im
e:
 1
7:
44
Fi
le
na
m
e:
 D
:\r
ep
or
ts
\c
jlt
\a
rt
ic
le
s\
06
_0
3\
ch
as
se
.d
at
Se
q:
 2
2
